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Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
I. INTRODUCTION

Once-thriving securities-fraud lawsuits, hailed by shareholders and

bashed by businesses, are facing an onslaught of legal challenges that
could cripple the controversial class actions. The number of federal
securities-fraud lawsuits is steadily falling. Businesses are stepping
up their assault on what they call frivolous litigation. Government
investigations are chilling plaintiff s attorneys. I

This quote aptly characterizes the general hostility with which
securities fraud lawsuits are viewed. Now the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
continues the attack.2
Much of this onslaught was brought about by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA"). 3 In 1995, Congress enacted the
PSLRA 4 which altered the pleading, 5 discovery, 6 and liability 7 rules for
cases brought under the federal securities laws. One significant aspect

1. Edward Iwata, Fewer Lawsuits Charge Securities Fraud, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 2007,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2007- 10-07-securities-fraud-lawsuitsN.htm.
2. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-10 (2007)
(requiring courts to determine whether a securities fraud complaint alleges a strong inference of
scienter by considering nonculpable inferences, weighing them against the inference of scienter,
and then finding that the culpable inference is at least as likely as the nonculpable inference at the
pleading stage prior to discovery).
3. Traditionally, before the enactment of the PSLRA most circuits applied Rule 9(b) to
securities fraud claims. See, e.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting that Rule 9(b) has been recognized as applicable to securities fraud claims either
explicitly or implicitly).
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, et seq. (2000).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)-(2) (requiring a plaintiff to specify each statement alleged to have
been misleading, the reasons why it is misleading, and how it gives rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with scienter).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (staying discovery until after a court rules on a 12(b)(6)
motion).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (changing the standard from joint and several liability to proportionate
liability). Originally, the Act provided for joint and several liability, allowing a plaintiff to
recover an entire judgment from any one defendant. However, to remedy this disproportionate
bearing of liability, the PSLRA imposed a proportionate liability standard. S. REP. No. 104-98, at
7 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686. This also had the effect of indirectly
dealing with large legal fees. But see DAVID J. BERSHAD ET AL., SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS:
ABUSES AND REMEDIES 27 (Edward J. Yodowitz et al. eds., 1994) (dissenting introduction)
(arguing a scheme of proportionate liability would penalize innocent victims where a culpable
defendant simply cannot pay his share).
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of the PSLRA is its heightened pleading requirement.8 The PSLRA
requires plaintiffs to plead a strong inference of scienter in averments of
fraud.9 However, as most of the circuits have lamented, the PSLRA
10
fails to adequately define "strong inference."
Pleadings are considered the key to the courthouse door. l Absent a
well-pled complaint, plaintiffs have no chance of relief.12 Because
securities litigation can amount to the recovery or loss of billions of
dollars, clarity in securities pleadings is particularly important. 13 In
June of 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the meaning of "strong
inference" in Tellabs.14 This Note argues that while the rule set forth by
the Supreme Court in Tellabs clarifies the pleading standard, the

8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring a plaintiff to allege facts with particularity, with respect
to each act or omission, that give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind). This Note will not discuss in depth the discovery and liability provisions
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
10. Compare Brown v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2005)
(stating a court must consider nonculpable inferences) and Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group
Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 347 (4th Cir. 2003) (weighing both culpable and nonculpable inferences) and
Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2003) (requiring a court to consider
inferences but specifically refrain from weighing) with Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893,
898 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring a court to consider and weigh nonculpable inferences) and Helwig
v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (limiting the plaintiffs inferences to only the
most plausible inferences).
11. See Marcia Coyle, Prevailing Winds: In the First Full Term with Alito, Court Took
Marked Conservative Turn, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 2007 (noting that Justices Roberts and Alito, as
former Reagan lawyers, knew that doctrines like pleading, standing, and statutes of limitation
provide keys to the courthouse door, and that a more stringent application of these doctrines
dramatically narrows the amount of cases getting into court).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (stating a complaint which fails to state a claim shall be
dismissed). But see Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud,82 MINN.
L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1997-1998) (arguing pleadings are significant in the securities fraud context
because plaintiffs who survive a 12(b)(6) motion are "virtually assured a settlement").
13. See Miest, supra note 12, at 1104 n.6 (noting that the dominant plaintiffs firm Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, LLP won more than $1 billion in settlements); see also
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings: 2007 Mid-Year Assessment (2007),
available at http://comerstone.com/pdf/practice-securities/CSRReleaseYIR2007.pdf [hereinafter
Cornerstone Research] (noting that the maximum dollar losses in the first half of 2007 amounted
to $69 billion); Todd Foster et al., Recent Trends in ShareholderClass Action Litigation: Filings
Stay Low and Average Settlements Stay High-But are these Trends Reversing?, NERA
Economic Consulting, 8-9 (Sept. 2007), http://www.nera.com/image/PUBRecentTrends
_Sep2007_2color web-FINAL.pdf (finding that all top ten shareholder class action settlements as
of June 30, 2007 topped $1 billion for the first time ever with Enron weighing in at a $7.2 billion
settlement).
14. See infra Part 1V.A (discussing the guidelines the Tellabs decision provides lower courts
as well as ambiguities left by in its wake).

2008]

Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.

resulting definition relies on unsubstantiated fears of excessive litigation
16
costs 15 and unconstitutionally infringes on the Seventh Amendment.
Part 1H of this Note provides a brief history of the regulation of the
securities market. 17 Knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the
enactment of both the securities laws and the PSLRA is vital to
understanding the true intent behind these regulations. Next, this Note
18
briefly highlights the circuit split that gave rise to the Tellabs issue.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs, providing an
in-depth account of the factual history of the case and the lower court
decisions. 19 Part IV describes how the Supreme Court's decision
resolves the split among the circuits, 20 and also illustrates how fears of
excessive litigation, which are the center of the Court's rationale, are
largely unsubstantiated. 2 l This Part argues that the Tellabs decision
fails to achieve the balance inherent in the PSLRA and thus risks further
dismissal of meritorious claims. 22 Next, it asserts that the Court's rule
unduly infringes on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by
requiring courts to resolve disputed questions of fact. 23 Last, Part IV
argues that the Court should have adopted the probable cause standard
24
set forth in the dissenting opinion.
Part V explores the impact of the Tellabs decision. 25 Specifically,
this Part examines how the Tellabs rule has begun to evolve. 26 This
15. See infra Part V.B (arguing that the Court's concern with excessive litigation is
unsubstantiated, that the PSLRA contains other provisions to more appropriately deal with
discovery concerns, and that the Court's adopted standard fails to achieve the balance called for
by the PSLRA).
16. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that the Court requires judges to determine disputed issues of
fact at the pleading stage and thus infringes on the Seventh Amendment jury trial right).
17. See infra Part II (tracing the development of the 1933 Act, 1934 Act, and the PSLRA).
18. See infra Part II.C (discussing the circuit division over whether competing inferences are
to be weighed or considered on a 12(b)(6) motion).
19. See infra Part III (detailing the Tellabs litigation, the district court, Seventh Circuit, and
Supreme Court opinions).
20. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that Tellabs crafts a rule whereby securities fraud plaintiffs
get the benefit of a tie between competing inferences on a 12(b)(6) motion, but leaves questions
over its application).
21. See infra Part IV.B (saying that the concern of rising litigation is unfounded, other PSLRA
provisions are more suited to address this concern, and there is an inherent balance the PSLRA
should achieve, namely preventing the filing of strike suits but preserving merited ones).
22. See infra Part IV.B.3 (saying that the Tellabs rule will cause meritorious securities fraud
actions to be dismissed).
23. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Tellabs as it relates to the Seventh Amendment's right to a
jury trial).
24. See infra Part IV.D (arguing that a probable cause approach achieves the required
heightened standard but does not infringe on the Seventh Amendment).
25. See infra Part V (discussing recent interpretations of Tellabs and how a plaintiff now faces
a harder time surviving a motion to dismiss).
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Part also discusses the outcome of the Tellabs case on remand and
thereby illustrates the difficulty a plaintiff now faces in surviving a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 27 Part VI concludes that Tellabs, while
setting forth a homogeneous standard, relies on erroneous concerns of
strike suits and adopts an approach that violates the Seventh
Amendment. 28 Ultimately, the Tellabs decision seriously impedes the
29
ability of injured investors to bring suit.
II.BACKGROUND
The legislative history of securities regulation provides a crucial
backdrop for understanding the Tellabs decision. 30 This Part describes
the statutory predecessors of the PSLRA and the origins of securities
fraud claims. 3 1 It then explains the congressional enactment of the
PSLRA. 32 Last, this Part describes the resulting division among the
circuits as to how to interpret the PSLRA's "strong inference"
33
provision.
A. The InitialRegulation of Securities and an Inference of Scienter
The stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression

caused immense economic turmoil.34 Looking for a source of blame,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt pointed the finger at the excesses of big

26. See infra Part V.A (examining recent circuit court decisions where application of Tellabs
results in dismissal of claims).
27. See infra Part V.B (examining the Tellabs case on remand and what it means for
plaintiffs).
28. See infra Part VI (concluding that the Supreme Court's decision rests on unsubstantiated
fears of frivolous securities litigation and defines "strong inference" in a way which requires
courts to sift through reasonable, competing inferences and thus usurps a jury function).
29. See infra Part VI (demonstrating a securities fraud plaintiff's difficulty in surviving a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss by exploring the Tellabs case on remand and recent interpretations of
Tellabs in the circuits).
30. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2007) (citing
legislative history of the PSLRA to establish congressional intent).
31. See infra Part Hl.A (discussing the initial regulations of the securities market).
32. See infra Part H.B (discussing the PSLRA and its "strong inference" requirement).
33. See infra Part II.C (examining the division among the circuits on whether to consider and
weigh both culpable and nonculpable inferences in assessing whether a strong inference has been
pled).
34. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006) ("In response to the sudden and
disastrous collapse in prices of stocks in 1929, and the Great Depression that followed, Congress
enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ...and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ....
").
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business. 3 5 As part of his New Deal legislation, Roosevelt promulgated
two statutes that would change the landscape of securities trading: the
Securities Act of 193336 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.37
38
First, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 ("the 1933 Act").
The 1933 Act's primary objectives were to provide investors with
sufficient and significant information regarding securities that were
offered for sale and to prohibit deceit and fraud by the offerors. 39 Also,
to regulate secondary trading of securities, Congress passed the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act"). 40 The primary aim
of the 1934 Act was to protect investors against the manipulation of
stock prices. 4 1 To achieve this end, the 1934 Act gave shareholders the
right to bring an action in federal court to recover damages for securities
fraud.4 2 As a result, the majority of securities fraud claims are brought
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the Security and Exchange
Commission's rule promulgated thereunder, Rule 1Ob-5. 4 3 Such
claims, commonly referred to as lOb-5 actions, allow a private plaintiff
to recover damages caused by an act or omission resulting in fraud or

35. 26 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, The PSLRA, Enron and Laxity, in SECURITIES LITIGATION
DAMAGES § 4:4 (2007) (quoting Judge Abner J. Mikva discussing the history of FDR's enacting
the Securities Act of 1933). But see Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as
Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L. J. 1843, 1849
(2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 457 (6th ed. 2003) (arguing that the
market crash was not a result of fraud or other corporate abuses, rather, the market crash resulted
from the expectation of the decline in economic activity; thus, asserting that one is entitled to be
skeptical about aspects of securities regulation designed to prevent another market crash).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2000) et seq.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000) et seq.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a). The 1933 Act was the first federal regulation of securities laws.
39. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). But see POSNER, supra note 35, at
457-58 (noting that the SEC's requirement that issues of stock were to be submitted by a
prospectus in advance actually inhibits the flow of information as these prospectuses are written
in legal and accounting jargon). Nevertheless, something is better than nothing.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2000) et seq. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also established the
Securities and Exchange Commission which continues to this day.
41. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
42. Neither Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act nor SEC Rule lOb-5 explicitly
provides for a private cause of action. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
729-30 (1975). Federal courts, however, recognize the rights of private litigants to seek relief
under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196; Superintendent of Ins. of the State
of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Rule 10b-5 actions grew in such
popularity that Justice Rehnquist described them as "judicial oak[s] which [have] grown from
little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737. But see POSNER, supra
note 35, at 460 (arguing that private causes of action may result in over deterrence and unjust
enrichment).
43. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule lOb-5 and Its New Statute of
Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51 BUS. LAW. 309, 310 (1996).
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deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 4 4 The six
elements that a plaintiff must allege and prove for a 1Ob-5 action are:
(1) that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission;
(2) that the defendant acted with scienter or a wrongful state of mind;
(3) that the material misrepresentation or omission was made in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) that the plaintiff
relied on the material misrepresentation; (5) that the plaintiff suffered an
economic loss as a result; and (6) that the material misrepresentation
45
actually caused the loss.
Eventually, after the enactment of these regulations, "America's
financial markets became the envy of the world."4 6 Foreign capital
flowed into the United States from foreign investors who felt assured
that American markets were not being manipulated. 4 7 Investors
received assurance because defrauded investors could bring a private
action to recover damages upon a violation of the securities laws. 48 Yet
in the 1990s, Wall Street and Congress began to perceive a threat to the
stability of the American financial markets from frivolous investor
suits 49 and strike suits. 50 In response, Congress passed the Private
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
45. Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (citing the elements of a
RulelOb-5 claim). Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185 n.l.
46. See KAUFMAN, supra note 35 (quoting Judge Abner J. Mikva discussing the history of
FDR's enacting the Securities Act of 1933); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995), as
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686; BERSHAD ET AL., supra note 7, at 11 ("Securities
markets in Japan and Europe involve greater risk for investors because there is less vigilance
against fraud and insider trading than in the U.S. markets, and because the standards for full and
fair disclosure... are only now becoming established.").
47. KAUFMAN, supra note 35 (discussing the history of the Securities Act of 1933).
48. S.REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995) as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687; Herbert E.
Milstein, Some Effects of PSLRA: A PlaintiffLawyer's Perspective, 1279 PLI CORP. 1251, 1253
(2001); see also BERSHAD ET AL., supra note 7, at 9 (dissenting introduction) (quoting the
president of Bear Stearns, formerly one of the largest global investment banks and securities
trading and brokerage firms, as saying "We think people are honest, but they're more honest if
you watch them like a hawk.").
49. S.REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also S.
REP. No. 104-98, at 5 (1995) as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684. Frivolous suit: a
lawsuit having no legal basis, often filed to harass or extort money from the defendant. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004). Throughout this Note, frivolous, nuisance, meritless, and
strike suits are used interchangeably and likewise, nonfrivolous, nonnuisance, and meritorious are
used interchangeably.
50. Congress noted:
The Committee heard substantial testimony that today certain lawyers file frivolous
"strike" suits alleging violations of the Federal Securities laws in the hope that
defendants will quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation. These suits, which
unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital and chill corporate disclosure, are
often based on nothing more than a company[']s announcement of bad news, not
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Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 5 1 Initially, President Bill
Clinton vetoed the Act, citing the heightened pleading requirement as
Congress overrode Clinton's veto and
his primary reason. 52 However,
53
made the PSLRA into law.
B. The PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act and the Strong
Inference of Scienter
Through the enactment of the PSLRA, Congress sought to
accomplish three goals: first, to encourage voluntary disclosure of

information by corporate issuers; second, to empower investors rather
than their lawyers; and third, to encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue
54
valid claims and to encourage defendants to fight abusive ones.
Congress' third aim, to encourage the filing of valid claims, also had a
evidence of fraud.
S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also S. REP.
No. 104-98, at 5 (1995) as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684 (noting that the system is
being abused and misused); KAUFMAN, supra note 35 (discussing the history of the Securities
Acts); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730 (explaining abusive practices, including (1) routine filing of lawsuits against issuers
whenever there is a significant change in the stock price without regard to culpability, (2)
targeting deep pocket defendants and individuals covered by insurance, (3) imposing burdensome
discovery costs to push a settlement, and (4) class action manipulation). See generally BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 1999) (defining strike suit as a suit often based on no valid
claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated
settlement).
51. In 1994, when the Republicans won control of Congress, they passed the PSLRA as part
of their Contract with America. 27 ALSTON & BYRD, LLP, Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act-Major developments and issues, in SECURITIES LITIGATION FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1:2
(2007).
52. President Clinton stated:
Specifically, I object to the following elements of this bill. First, I believe that the
pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard to a defendant's state of
mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in
Federal courts. I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit
court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to
raise the standard even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that.
141 CONG. REC. S19035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).
53. 141 CONG. REC. S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. H15214-24 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1995).
54. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995) as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; Stephen J.
Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act? 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007). It is generally accepted that private causes of action further the
integrity of American markets. See generally H.R. REP. No. 105-803 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)
(Congressional finding that securities regulation has a dual aim of protecting investors and
promoting growth of financial markets); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (stating that the overriding purpose of the
nation's securities laws is to protect investors and maintain confidence in the market so national
savings and investments may grow for the benefit of all).
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flip side: to prevent in terrorem settlements. 55 In an effort to curb these
perceived abuses of the lOb-5 action, 56 Congress imposed a variety of
procedural barriers to securities fraud actions, including a heightened
pleading requirement, 57 which states:
[I]n any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant
58

acted with the required state of mind.

55. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995) as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 ("The
dynamics of private securities litigation create powerful incentives to settle . . . . Many such
actions are brought on the basis of their settlement value. The settlement value to defendants turns
more on the expected costs of defense than the merits of the underlying claim."). In terrorem
settlements are settlements a defendant enters into for fear of costly litigation. In terrorem is Latin
meaning "in order to frighten." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (8th ed. 2004).
56. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2007); see 26
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Generally, in SECURITIES
LITIGATION DAMAGES § 3:1 (2007) (noting that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act had
parallel effects on both the Securities Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, impacting areas
such as class action litigation, forward-looking statements, pleading requirements, RICO liability,
and auditor disclosures); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736 ("The cost of discovery often forces innocent parties to settle
frivolous securities class actions."); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914-15 (2003) (saying that the three goals of the
PSLRA are: (1) to reduce the costs that securities actions impose on the capital markets by
discouraging the filing of non-meritorious suits; (2) to reduce litigation risk for high technology
issuers; and (3) to reduce the race to the courthouse door whereby class actions are filed soon
after a significant stock price declines). But see Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that the report of a single committee of a single House does not express the will of
Congress).
57. See Perino, supra note 56, at 925 (noting that the pleading requirement actually has three
components: (1) a specificity requirement, (2) a particularity requirement for complaints pled on
information and belief, and (3) the strong inference requirement).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the
federal circuits uniformly held that intent and recklessness would suffice to plead scienter
although they differed on the degree of specificity required. See Miest, supra note 12, at 1109-12
(discussing the state of pleading scienter in securities fraud claims prior to the enactment of the
PSLRA). This "strong inference" language was seemingly adopted from the Second Circuit. See
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The requisite 'strong
inference' of fraud may be established either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had
both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness."). However, the legislative
history suggests Congress did not intend to codify the Second Circuit's strong inference standard
and instead explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's requirement that a plaintiff must allege motive
and opportunity or reckless or conscious behavior. Congress aimed for a standard similar to Rule
9(b), but above the Second Circuit's interpretation:
The Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading standard of the
Second Circuit. The standard also is specifically written to conform the language to
Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading with "particularity." Regarded as the most stringent
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Congress, however, failed to elaborate on what allegations would
suffice to create such a strong inference of scienter, leaving the courts to
59
flesh out an interpretation.
C. The Circuit Split: Weighing, Accepting, and Limiting Inferences at
the PleadingStage
Without legislative guidance on how to apply the scienter
requirement, the federal courts embarked on the long road of discerning
the congressional intent behind the nebulous language of "strong
inference." 60 The circuits invariably took different paths. 6 1 Part III will
describe how the Supreme Court in Tellabs set out to resolve the circuit
dispute concerning whether nonculpable inferences 6 2 should be
63
considered in assessing whether a strong inference exists.
Before Tellabs, some circuits required courts to consider nonculpable
or innocent inferences, as well as culpable inferences, in determining
whether a strong inference of scienter had been alleged.6 4 In Brown v.
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., for example, a group of investors
brought a securities fraud class action against a financial services firm

pleading standard, the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with
particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of the
defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen
existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case
law interpreting this pleading standard.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
Congress specifically denied including motive, opportunity, or recklessness in the language of the
statute. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 49 n.23 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 748. But see Brief for Respondents at 26, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights,
127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484) (arguing Congress did not intend to depart from the Second
Circuit's recognition that strong inference still requires a court to accept all allegations as true and
to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff) [hereinafter Brief for Resp. (No. 06484)].
59. See infra Part II.C (discussing the emergent circuit split regarding the determination of a
"strong inference" of scienter).
60. See infra notes 65-86 and accompanying text (describing paths taken by the First, Fourth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits in assessing a "strong inference" under the PSLRA).
61. See infra notes 65-86 and accompanying text (describing the different interpretations the
circuits have taken in determining whether to consider and weigh competing nonculpable
inferences on a 12(b)(6) motion).
62. Nonculpable inferences are inferences which would exonerate or "detract from the
strength of the inference of scienter." Winters v. Stemberg, No. 07-10193-WGY, 2008 WL
62465, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 2008).
63. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2506 (2007); see also
Perino, supra note 56, at 926 (noting that the PSLRA did not achieve its goal of resolving the
circuit split of pleadings for securities fraud claims and noting specifically the sharp split among
the circuits over the "strong inference" standard).
64. Brown v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2005).
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and its analysts. 6 5 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's analysts
made misleading statements in the form of false investor ratings about
the corporation's stock.6 6 The First Circuit held that when assessing
whether the plaintiff has pled a strong inference of scienter in a 12(b)(6)
motion, a court should not delve into individualized assessments but
rather consider all competing inferences, both culpable and
nonculpable. 67 However, the court applied this standard to find that the
plaintiff failed to allege a strong inference of scienter because the
circumstances surrounding the assignment of the rating were susceptible
to other nonculpable inferences. 6 8 The First Circuit found that the
nonculpable, inherent subjectivity of the investor recommendations,
when compared with the culpable inference of corruption, was not
69
enough to allege a strong inference of scienter.
Similarly, in Gompper v. VISX, Inc., the Ninth Circuit required that a
court not only consider nonculpable inferences, but also weigh these
inferences and find on balance that there is a strong inference of
scienter. 70 The Ninth Circuit was primarily concerned with Congress'
intent to eliminate abusive and opportunistic securities litigation. 71 The
court stated that the PSLRA "significantly altered pleading
requirements" 72 by requiring courts to consider inferences opposing the

65. Id. at 41-42.
66. Id. at 42. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the analysts were issuing stock ratings,
such as "buy," when in fact the analysts believed such stock was not of such a quality. Id. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's analysts issued "bullish reports .. .to curry favor with
[another corporation] and thereby secure future investment banking business." Id. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant issued a buy rating for the stock despite reservations the defendant had
about the other corporation's growth. Id. at 44. This was evidenced by various emails sent
between the defendant's employees and the other company's director of investor relations as well
as some internal emails. Id.
67. Brown, 431 F.3d at 46, 51.
68. Id. at 47 ("Armed with the same background facts, two knowledgeable analysts, each
acting in the utmost good faith, could well assign different ratings to the same stock."). The
Fourth Circuit similarly requires courts to consider culpable and nonculpable inferences in
determining whether the plaintiff adequately alleged scienter. Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic
Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 347 (4th Cir. 2003) (weighing both culpable and nonculpable
inferences such as the inference that the defendant's understating of the number of postacquisition departures was due to either fraud or the fact that the corporation was in the midst of a
complex nationwide integration and the number of departures were simply undercounted).
69. Brown, 431 F.3d at 49-50.
70. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. Id. But see Shaun Mulreed, Comment, PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Failure: How
Scienter Has Prevented the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 From Achieving Its
Goals, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 817-18 (2005) (illustrating how the Ninth Circuit's standard,
as articulated in Gompper, may actually lower the standard by allowing the standard to be applied
in a lofty fashion).
72. Gompper, 298 F.3d at 895.
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plaintiff, because a failure to do so would eviscerate the PSLRA's
requirement by allowing plaintiffs to plead in a
strong inference
73
vacuum.
Other circuits required courts to consider nonculpable inferences, but
refrained from any weighing of these inferences. 74 For instance, the
Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected a weighing of inferences in Pirragliav.
Novell.7 5 In Pirraglia,a group of investors brought a securities fraud
class action against the Novell Corporation alleging that individual
officers made false statements and issued false financial reports. 7 6 In
assessing whether the plaintiffs alleged a strong inference of scienter,
the Tenth Circuit considered the Ninth Circuit's standard as expressed
in Gompper.77 The Tenth Circuit agreed that courts should consider all
reasonable inferences, culpable and nonculpable. 7 8 However, the Tenth
Circuit found that while the court must consider both types of
inferences, it should not weigh them because to do so would invade the
traditional role of the fact finder. 7 9 The Tenth Circuit ultimately settled
on its own interpretation of the standard-if the plaintiffs complaint
alleges facts which give rise to a strong inference of scienter
holistically, the plaintiff has pled the requisite strong inference. 80 The
court held that competing inferences are recognized in an evaluative,
81
not preclusive, manner.
In contrast to all other circuits, the Sixth
other inferences at all, but rather limits its
most plausible of inferences. 82 In Helwig v.
stated that inferences, even those adverse

Circuit does not consider
consideration to only the
Vencor, the Sixth Circuit
to a plaintiff, must be

73. Id. at 896.
74. Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2003).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1184. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants falsely told analysts and investors
that demand for Novell products was high even absent any special promotional tactics and that
such forecasts were reflective of end-user demand and not the result of over-inventoried items.
Id. at 1186.
77. Id. at 1187-88.
78. Id. at 1187. The Court stated, "Whether an inference is a strong one cannot be decided in
a vacuum." Id. This language would later be expressed by the Court in Tellabs. Tellabs, Inc., v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007) ("The strength of an inference cannot
be decided in a vacuum. The inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is it that one
conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the underlying facts?").
79. Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
80. Id. Ultimately, the Court would affirm in part and reverse in part finding sufficient
allegations to establish scienter, but not particularity. Id.
81. Id. at 1187.
82. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2000).
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construed in the plaintiff's favor. 83 Similar to the Tenth Circuit, the
84
Sixth Circuit reserves the weighing of inferences for the fact finder.
The court was concerned that the pleading standard would become a
"choke-point for meritorious claims" and, therefore, sought to avoid
premature dismissal of such claims. 8 5 Thus, the circuits ran the gamut
of possibilities in determining whether inferences are to be weighed at
the pleading stage-setting the scene for the Supreme Court to resolve
86
the matter.
III. DISCUSSION
Despite the wide variety of interpretations proposed by the circuits,
87
none of these views were adopted by the Supreme Court in Tellabs.
Instead, Tellabs requires that in determining whether a plaintiffs
securities fraud complaint meets the requirements of the PSLRA and,

therefore, gives rise to a "strong inference" of scienter, a court must
consider competing inferences and weigh them. 88 The court then must
determine that the pled facts have given rise to an inference of scienter
at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference. 89 This Part will

83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that plaintiffs already face procedural hurdles imposed by the
PSLRA such as the stay of discovery provisions. Id. Ironically, the Sixth Circuit's standard in
effect is a rather vigorous standard, allowing the benefit of only the most plausible of competing
inferences. Id.
86. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text (describing various approaches taken by the
circuit courts in assessing whether a plaintiff has pled a "strong inference" of scienter). The
circuits were likewise divided not only as to whether nonculpable inferences are to be considered
in assessing a "strong inference" but also as to what kind of allegations qualified to allege a
strong inference of scienter. First, some circuits applied the Second Circuit's standard that
required plaintiffs to plead only mere motive and opportunity or to establish an inference of
recklessness. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000). Second, some courts
heightened the Second Circuit's standard by rejecting motive and opportunity as sufficient, but
still allowing an inference of recklessness to suffice as a strong inference. See, e.g., In re
Comshare, Inc. Secs. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the
PSLRA, plaintiffs may plead scienter by alleging facts giving rise to a strong inference of
recklessness, but not by alleging facts merely establishing that defendant had motive and
opportunity to commit securities fraud). Third, the harshest standard, as set forth by the Ninth
Circuit, would allow only an inference of conscious conduct to suffice to allege a strong
inference. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
The Ninth Circuit's approach is considered "extremely harsh." See 26 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN,
Pleading State of Mind, in SECURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES §3:10 (2007) (characterizing the

Silicon decision as implementing an extremely harsh standard for securities fraud claims).
87. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-10 (2007).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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begin with the factual background of the case. 90 It will then discuss the
Tellabs decision, including the holdings of the district court91 and the
Seventh Circuit.92 Finally, it will explain how the Supreme Court
93
ultimately resolved the circuit divide.
A. FactualBackground. The Seeds of Fraud
The investor-plaintiffs in Tellabs brought a securities fraud class
action under §10(b) 94 and SEC Rule lOb-5 95 against Tellabs, Inc.,
Richard Notebaert, and Michael Birck, alleging that they engaged in a
scheme to defraud investors of the true value of the company's stock
during the class period. 9 6 Tellabs makes and markets specialized
optical equipment and acts as a supplier of Internet networking
solutions and services. 9 7 Michael Birck, one of the founders of Tellabs,
was an officer and director during the class period. 9 8 Richard
Notebaert, also a director, was the CEO and president during the class
period. 9 9 The products at issue in the case were the Titan 5500 and the

Titan 6500.100

The Titan 5500 was the Tellabs flagship optical

networking system. 10
The Titan 6500 was a new multi-service
transport switch, capable of simultaneously transporting a variety of

90. See infra Part III.A (detailing the facts surrounding the litigation as alleged in the
plaintiff's complaint and as recounted by the courts).
91. See infra Part III.B (describing the district court's decision dismissing the complaint).
92. See infra Part III.C (examining the Seventh Circuit's ruling affirming the dismissal in part
and reversing in part).
93. See infra Part II.D (exploring the Supreme Court's analysis and holding).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
95. SEC Rule 1Ob-5; 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.
96. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2505 (2007). Tellabs'
customers included exchange carriers, telephone companies, local telephone administrations,
cellular and wireless service companies, cable operators, and internet service providers. Johnson
v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (N.D. I11.2004), rev'd, 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007).
97. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 945. Some of Tellabs' customers included SBC
Communications, Inc., and Verizon Communications, Inc. Second Consol. Amended Class
Action Complaint at 3, Johnson v. Tellabs, 303 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. I11.2004) (No. 02-CV4356) [hereinafter Tellabs Compl.]. Verizon Communications, Inc., accounted for approximately
19.1% of net sales in 2000. Id. at$ 33.
98. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
99. Id. at 945-46.
100. Id. at 946.
101. Id. The Titan 5500 directs different types of communications traffic across wired and
wireless networks. Tellabs Compl., supra note 97, at 30. The Titan 5500 also includes access,
transportation, and management capabilities for fiber optic networks, which are a critical part of
voice and data communications infrastructures. Id.
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wireless signals. 10 2 The plaintiffs based their allegations
on information
10 3
provided by twenty-seven confidential sources.
The events upon which the claims were based unfolded in December
of 2000, the start of the class period, with a press release issued by
Tellabs announcing a $100 million contract between Tellabs and Sprint
for the purchase of the Titan 6500.104 The press release stated that the
Titan 6500 was "available now" and the Titan 5500 was experiencing
continued growth. 10 5 Later, Notebaert told financial
analysts that there
1
would be "continuing growth of the Titan 5500." 06
In January of 2001, Notebaert, on behalf of Tellabs, issued another
press release stating that customers were buying more and more Tellabs
equipment and that demand for the Titan 6500 was exceeding
expectations. 10 7 When speaking with financial analysts, Notebaert said,
"We feel very, very good about the robust growth we're
experiencing."' 1 8 The next month, a letter was sent to stockholders,
signed by Notebaert and Birck, stating that Titan 5500 sales were
soaring and that customers were embracing the Titan 6500 since its
release from the lab. 10 9 The letter was accompanied by the company's
annual report, also signed by both Notebaert and Birck, which said
10
growth for the Titan 5500 was still going strong.
However, in March of 2001, despite these positive forecasts, Tellabs
lowered its revenue and earnings expectations, noting that it recognized
1
no revenue from the Titan 6500 shipments in the first quarter.' '
Despite these inconsistencies, Tellabs announced that it expected

102. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
103. Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub
nom. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
104. Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (N.D. Ill. 2004), rev'd 437 F.3d 588
(7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499
(2007). The press release stated, "Tellabs today announced a multiyear agreement with Sprint for
the Titan 6500 multiservice transport switch .... The agreement is expected to be valued at more
than $100 million over the life of the contract ....
The TITAN 6500 is available now." (emphasis
in original). Tellabs Compl., supra note 97, at [ 73.
105. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
106. Makor Issues & Rights, 437 F.3d at 592.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The annual report accompanied the letter signed by Birck and Notebaert, stating that
they were not worried that the Titan 5500 had peaked because they were experiencing the highest
revenues thus far and growth was still going strong. Id.
110. Id.
11. Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2004), rev'd sub nom.
Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
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increased second quarter revenue shipments of the Titan 6500.112
During this time, Notebaert was asked by securities analysts if Tellabs
was experiencing any weakness in sales of the Titan 5500.1 13 Notebaert
responded that the Titan 5500 was still experiencing strong acceptance
in the market. 114 Analysts then made recommendations to investors to
buy Tellabs stock.1 15 Also, Birck and Notebaert signed a report
indicating that the company achieved record level sales as a result of
continued strong demand for the Titan 5500.116
In April of 2001, Notebaert told securities analysts that everything
they heard from customers indicated strong demand for the Titan
6500.117 At the close of the class period in June of 2001, Tellabs issued
a press release revising second quarter revenue expectations from about
$800 million to $500 million, claiming customers were cautious about
buying new technology and equipment. 1 18 Tellabs stock fell from
$21.20 to $15.87,119 representing a decline of more than 75% from the
class period high of $67.125.120
The plaintiffs alleged that, throughout the class period, Tellabs,
Notebaert, and Birck employed a scheme to defraud investors.12 1 For
instance, the plaintiffs claimed that the $100 million contract signed by
Sprint was actually signed to satisfy an existing $100 million
commitment. 122 In fact, Sprint had no intention of purchasing any of
the Titan 6500 systems. 12 3 As evidence of financial motive, the
plaintiffs also pointed out that, during the class period, Birck sold
80,000 shares of Tellabs stock for about $5 million. 124 In addition,
despite claims that the Titan 5500 was experiencing robust growth,

112.

Id.
113. Id. at 956.
114. Id.
115. Id. In fact, the complaint calculated defendant Birck's proceeds from the sale to be
$5,183,150. Tellabs Compl., supra note 97, at 17.
116. Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949 (N.D. Il1. 2004), rev'd sub nom.
Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 949-50.
119. Id. at 948.
120. Id. at 950.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 946.
124. Id. at 950. Several other directors and/or officers were alleged to have sold Tellabs stock
during the class period. Id.
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demand for the product had actually dropped. 125 There were similar
problems with the Titan 6500; contrary to Notebaert's statements, the
26
Titan 6500 was unavailable to the public. 1
Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs over-inventoried
customers with Titan 5500s, knowing that this would result in reduced
sales and customer returns in early 2001.127 The plaintiffs also claimed
that Tellabs was engaging in channel stuffing. 12 8 Channel stuffing is a
practice whereby a supplier induces its customers to substantially
increase their purchases of particular products above what they would
otherwise buy from the company in the normal course of business, thus
giving the company the immediate appearance of rising revenue. 12 9 At
all times, the plaintiffs claimed that Notebaert and Birck were hands-on
0
managers and knew everything about the workings of the company.13
The plaintiffs also alleged that Notebaert and Birck saw daily reports
concerning Tellabs product bookings and revenues. 13 1 The entirety of
the plaintiffs' complaint rested on information from twenty-seven
132
confidential sources.
The allegations against the individual defendants, Notebaert and
Birck, consisted mainly of misstatements concerning the demand for the
Titan 5500, misstatements concerning the availability of the Titan 6500,
misstatements regarding Tellabs' fourth quarter financials as a result of

125. Id. at 946, 955. The plaintiffs alleged that tons of Titan 5500s were just sitting in
warehouses. Id. at 946. According to a confidential source, orders from every single Titan 5500
customer declined. Tellabs Compi., supra note 97, at 37.
126. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 957. The Titan 6500 was failing customer and lab trials. Id.
The Titan 6500 was not available for release in December. Id. at 957. In fact, the plaintiffs
claimed that not a single Titan 6500 was shipped during the class period. Makor Issues & Rights
v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 604 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub norn. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
127. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 959. Orders were written for products customers did not
want. Id. The defendants back-dated orders and offered excessive discounts which were hidden
from the public, to offer incentives to entice the purchase of the products. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. According to the plaintiffs, customers even called and complained about the channel
stuffing and over inventorying. Id.
130. Id. at 962.
131. Id. at 963. The plaintiffs also claimed that an independent research firm hired by Tellabs
to assess the demand for Titan's 5500 systems reported that demand would suffer a steep decline.
Id. at 964.
132. Tellabs Compl., supra note 97.
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1 33
and a resulting
over-inventorying customers (channel stuffing),
134
overstatement of Tellabs' revenue projections.

B. The DistrictCourt Decision: Dismissing the Complaint
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the
plaintiffs' second amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 135 The district court assessed the
a strong inference of scienter
complaint holistically and determined that
13 6
pleadings.
the
from
implied
be
not
could
First, the district court addressed the plaintiffs' attempt to plead
scienter for the misleading statements concerning the Titan 5500 and
the Titan 6500.137 As for Tellabs, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' allegation that the Tellabs executives, Notebaert and Birck,
were "hands on and knew everything."' 13 8 Such vague assertions,
on
according to the court, were insufficient to establish knowledge 139
behalf of Notebaert and Birck and thereby impute it onto Tellabs.
The district court also rejected the plaintiffs' allegations that a strong
inference of scienter was established by the fact that the quarterly status
reports depicted a decline in customer demand, daily product bookings,
and revenue statements. 140 The district court found that there was no
indication of any information in the reports that supported an inference

133. Channel stuffing creates the short-term illusion that demand is rising between the time a
company sends an extra product to distributors and the time when the distributors return it.
Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 598 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007). One of the confidential
sources for the plaintiffs claimed Tellabs at one point had to lease extra storage for all of the
returned product. Id. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg likened channel stuffing practices to
good and bad cholesterol. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 37-38, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484) (Ginsburg, J.) [hereinafter Tellabs, Tr. of
Oral Argument]. Justice Ginsburg said it was not clear here whether the plaintiffs were alleging
the good or the bad kind. Id. at 38.
134. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2505 (2007).
135. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 944. Specifically, the district court rejected the Second
Circuit's approach which required plaintiffs to allege either: (1)facts showing that the defendants
had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (2) facts constituting strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. Id. at 961 (citing Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345
(taking a holistic approach to determining scienter)). The district court did acknowledge that such
facts can be used as factors in determining whether a strong inference of scienter had been pled.
Id. at 961.
136. Id.
137. Id.
at962-64.
138. Id. at962.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 962-63.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

that the company knew that the statements in the press release were

false. 141
The district court also considered whether the plaintiffs had alleged
sufficient facts to establish that the individual defendants, Notebaert and
Birck, possessed the requisite scienter for these misstatements. 14 2 The
plaintiffs tried to establish the defendants' scienter based on the fact that
defendant Birck sold Tellabs' stock during the class period. 143 The
court reasoned that while such action may provide circumstantial
evidence of scienter as indicative of financial motive, it must be
dramatically out of line with prior trading practices, and hence actually
suspicious, to establish a strong inference of scienter. 144 Because
Birck's action did not contradict his prior trading practice, the district
court dismissed this allegation. 145 Notebaert was not alleged to have
146
sold stock during the class period.
The plaintiffs also claimed that Birck knew and disregarded the
falsity of the statements because of his position within Tellabs, and that
he had "his hands on the pulse of everything," attended town hall
147
meetings, and heard sales personnel briefs concerning product status.
However, the district court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish
scienter for Birck in this regard because they did not allege the kind of
information to which Birck was privy. 14 8 The court dismissed Birck
from the complaint, finding that the allegations against Birck amounted
14 9
to no more than generalized imputations of knowledge.
For Notebaert, the district court similarly concluded that the general
conclusions alleged by the plaintiff were insufficient to establish his
scienter. 150 The plaintiffs alleged that he attended town hall meetings,
141. Id. at963.
142. Id. With respect to Birck, the plaintiffs alleged that Birck had his "hands on the pulse of
the company," attended town hall meetings, and heard sales personnel briefings concerning
product status. Id. at 967.
143. Id. at 962.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 962. The court noted that while Birck sold 80,000 shares of common stock, he was
the owner of over thirty-seven million shares of Tellabs' common stock. Id. The court also noted
that the plaintiffs failed to allege any history of trading on the part of Birck that would indicate
this sale was out of line with prior trading practices on his behalf. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 967.
148. Id.
149. Id. ("In essence, Plaintiffs' scienter allegations amount to the argument that Birck knew
or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the statements because of his position .. . .Given the
mandates of the PSLRA, these allegations in their totality fall short of providing a strong
inference of scienter.").
150. Id. at 968.
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discussed revenues with senior vice presidents of Tellabs, and knew
whether Tellabs' products were selling.151 However, because no details
regarding precisely what Notebaert learned during this period were
152
alleged, there was no strong inference of scienter.
Next, the district court addressed whether the plaintiffs had alleged
scienter for the channel stuffing allegation. 153 The district court
considered only whether scienter for Notebaert and Tellabs was
established, because it had already dismissed defendant Birck. 154 The
plaintiffs claimed Notebaert worked directly with sales personnel to
engage in channel stuffing. 155 Nevertheless, the district court found this
allegation insufficient. 156 The district court reasoned that the absence of
allegations specifying exactly what it was Notebaert engaged in left the
court unable to conclude that what Notebaert was doing was inherently
57

wrong. 1

In sum, because the district court failed to find scienter for the
underlying allegations, it did not find scienter for the overstated revenue
1
projections. 58
C. The Seventh CircuitDecision: Strong Inference According to a
Reasonable Person and the Seventh Amendment Quandary
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. 159 The Seventh Circuit framed the issue as: "[Hiow much, in
the way of factual detail in the pleadings, is sufficient to create this
'strong inference' of the requisite scienter?" 160 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court's holding, finding that the plaintiffs alleged
facts sufficient to support a strong inference of scienter against
Notebaert and Tellabs, but not against Birck. 16 1 According to the
Seventh Circuit, a plaintiff demonstrates a strong inference of scienter if

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 968-69.
154. Id.
155. Id. ("Plaintiffs further allege that according to [confidential source 3], Notebaert knew
about the channel stuffing activity relating to the Titan 5500 and he pushed and prodded the
Company's sales personnel.") (internal quotes omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 964.
159. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated,
127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007).
160. Id. at 595.
161. Id. at605.
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a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the
162
required intent.
Initially, the Seventh Circuit tried to discern the congressional intent
behind the passage of the PSLRA.163 The court found that Congress did
not change existing law with the enactment of the "strong inference"
standard; it reasoned that if Congress had wanted to change existing
law, it would have done so explicitly. 16 4 Therefore, the court applied
the same standard that existed prior to the PSLRA's enactment. 165 In
applying this standard, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that although
motive and opportunity may be useful factors, they do not make or
break the sufficiency of the pleading. 166 Furthermore, the court rejected
the idea that plaintiffs are only entitled to the most plausible inferences,
as the Sixth Circuit found in Helwig,16 7 because of the potential to
infringe on a plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 168 The
Seventh Circuit held that scienter is a question of fact 16 9 and stated the
standard as follows:
[W]e will allow the complaint to survive if it alleges facts from which
...

a reasonableperson could infer that the defendant acted with the
. . . . Faced with two seemingly equally strong

required intent

162. Id. at 602.
163. Id. at 600 ("In passing the PSLRA, some in Congress recorded their belief that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) had not prevented abuse of the securities laws by private litigants...
• To address this perceived abuse, the PSLRA changes the threshold pleading rules...") (internal
citations omitted).
164. Id. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Just as Rule 9(b) makes no mention of municipal liability ...
neither does it refer to employment discrimination. Thus complaints in these cases, as in most
others, must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).") (internal citations omitted);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 1999) ("expressio unius est exclusio alterius. A canon
of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or
of the alternative").
165. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 600. The court began by outlining the three
main existing approaches to establishing a strong inference of scienter: (1) plaintiffs can state a
claim by pleading either (a) motive and opportunity or (b) strong circumstantial evidence of
recklessness or conscious misbehavior. Id. at 601 (citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309-10
(2d Cir. 2000); (2) plaintiffs can state a claim by pleading facts showing (a) simple recklessness
or (b) a motive to commit fraud and opportunity. Id. at 601 (citing In Re Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999); or (3) plaintiffs can state a claim by pleading
enough facts that establish altogether a strong inference of scienter. Id. at 601. See, e.g.,
Ottmann v. Hangar Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Helwig v. Vencor,
Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550-52 (6th Cir. 2000) (taking a holistic approach to determining scienter).
166. Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 601.
167. Id. at 602.
168. Id.
169. Id. A question of fact is an issue that has not been predetermined and authoritatively
answered by the law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (8th ed. 1999).
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inferences, one favoring the plaintiff and one favoring the defendant, it
is inappropriate for us to make a determination as to which inference
will ultimately prevail, lest we invade the traditional role of the fact
finder. 170
The Seventh Circuit then examined whether the complaint stated
facts giving rise to a strong inference against Notebaert, Birck, and
Tellabs. 17 1 Because Notebaert made all statements while acting within
the scope of his position as CEO, these statements were imputed to the
172
corporate entity, Tellabs.
First, the Seventh Circuit examined whether there was scienter for
statements about the demand for the Titan 5500.173 The Seventh Circuit
held that Notebaert's statements that demand for the Titan 5500 was
growing while reports indicated the contrary, coupled with the
allegation that Notebaert "stayed on top of his company's financial
health," were enough for a reasonable person to infer the requisite
scienter. 174 As for Birck, evidence that he signed a letter stating that
things were "still going strong," attended town hall meetings, knew the
status of the product, and that he sold 80,000 Tellabs shares, came after
the Titan 5500 had already begun to decline. 175 Because of this, the
Seventh Circuit found the allegations insufficient to infer scienter
176
against Birck.
Second, the Seventh Circuit examined the statements concerning the
availability and demand for the Titan 6500.177 The Seventh Circuit held
that the plaintiffs succeeded in establishing a reasonable inference of
scienter for Notebaert by claiming that he saw weekly sales reports and
production projections, and that he therefore knew that the Titan 6500
did not
was not yet available to customers. 178 The Seventh Circuit
179
address any allegations in this regard against defendant Birck.

170. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 602 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 603.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. ("While it is conceivable that Notebaert had yet to see the reports suggesting his
company was in trouble ... the plaintiffs have provided enough for a reasonable person to infer
that Notebaert knew that his statements were false.").
175. Id. at 603-04.
176. Id. at 604. The court rejected the evidence of the stock sale because the plaintiffs failed
to allege that the sale of stock was substantially out of line with prior trading practices. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that not a single Titan 6500 was shipped. Id.
179. Id. at 603.
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Third, the Seventh Circuit addressed the channel stuffing
allegations. 180 The plaintiffs claimed that Notebaert worked directly
with Tellabs' sales personnel and that a high-level sales executive
admitted that purchase orders were fabricated. 18 1 The Seventh Circuit
imputed Notebaert's scienter for the channel stuffing allegation onto
Tellabs. 18 2 Thus, the Seventh Circuit found this was sufficient to
establish a strong inference of scienter for both Tellabs and
Notebaert. 183 The Seventh Circuit did not consider these allegations
184
against Birck.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that the overstated revenue
projections sufficiently established a strong inference of scienter
because they were supported by the company's statements that its
products were doing better than they actually were. 185 In sum, applying
a reasonable person standard, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
complaint, as pleaded, alleged sufficient facts to infer scienter against
186
Notebaert and Tellabs, but not Birck.
D. The Justices Weigh In
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Tellabs case "to
prescribe a workable construction of the 'strong inference' standard, a
reading geared toward the PSLRA's twin goals: to curb frivolous,
lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors' ability to recover
on meritorious claims." 187 However, the Court's true concern was
whether the complaint alleged a claim that was "not trial worthy, but

180. Id. at 604-05.
181. Id. at 605.
182. Id.
183. Id. On the other hand, however, the Seventh Circuit said the plaintiffs failed to provide
enough facts to support a strong inference of scienter against CEO Birck in this regard. Id. at 604
("We do not believe that the mere fact that he sold one percent of his stock necessarily establishes
a strong inference of scienter.").
184. Id.
185. Id. at 605 ("The scienter for those alleged misrepresentations serves as sufficient
circumstantial evidence of scienter here.").
186. Id. at 604.
187. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007). Justice
Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court in an 8-1 decision, in which Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer joined. Justices Scalia and
Alito concurred in the judgment. Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 2503.
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89
rather discovery worthy."1 88 The decision has two main components.1190
First, the Court settled the discussion about weighing inferences.
Second, the Court quelled concerns about the possibility that the
standard infringes on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 19 1

1. Weighing Inferences and Finding Culpability at Least as Likely
First, the Court clarified the PSLRA's pleading requirement. 192 The
Court emphasized that Congress' purpose in passing the statute was to
establish a uniform pleading standard designed to curb "nuisance
filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery
requests and manipulation by class action lawyers."' 19 3 With these aims
in mind, the Supreme Court announced the pleading standard required
by the PSLRA. 194 First, in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
1Ob-5 action, a court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true. 195 Second, a court must ask whether all of the facts alleged,
taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, rather than
whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that
standard. 196 Third, a court must weigh opposing inferences and find

188. Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 47 (as stated by Justice Stevens).
Compare Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the pleading standard
should effectively deter baseless actions) with id. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (saying that the
basic purpose of the pleading standard is to protect defendants from the costs of discovery and
trial in unmeritorious cases); see also Coyle, supra note 11 ("'We're seeing a lot of cases where
the justices don't see real injured people bringing real claims. They see lawyers trying to extort..
. The court acted similarly in the securities area in Tellabs ... by raising the bar on pleading a
claim under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.").
189. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-13.
190. See infra notes 192-215 and accompanying text (describing the new standard set forth by
the Court in assessing a "strong inference" and the justifications for it).
191. See infra notes 232-242 and accompanying text (examining the Court's analysis of the
Seventh Amendment issue behind considering and weighing inferences on a motion to dismiss).
192. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506 (2007) (noting the difference between the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits).
193. Id. at 2508. The Supreme Court cited various examples of just such an objective by
pointing out Congress' newly prescribed lead plaintiff and lead counsel procedures, and
Congress' enactment of the 'safe harbor' provision. Id. But see Brief for Joseph A. Grundfest et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 12, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, 127 S. Ct.
2499 (2007) (No. 06-484) (arguing that no formal legislative intent can be discerned, but rather
the Court should look to case law for history concerning lOb-5 claims for more adequate and
accurate guidance).
194. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509.
195. Id. The Court noted that, "[o]n this point, the parties agree." Id.
196. Id. This step adopts the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Gompper v. VISX, Inc.,
298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring courts to consider and weigh inferences).
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that a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter at least as
197
likely as any opposing inference.
The Court reasoned that plausible, opposing, nonculpable inferences
must be considered because the inquiry of whether something is
"strong" is inherently comparative. 19 8 However, the Court explicitly
rejected the notion that the inference that the defendant acted with
scienter needs to be irrefutable. 199 The Court clarified that the plaintiff
does not need the "smoking gun" to prevail.2 0 0
The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's standard, however,
primarily because it failed to screen out frivolous strike suits, one of
Congress' primary goals in enacting the PSLRA. 20 1 Thus, the Supreme

Court held that the inference must be more than "reasonable"-it must
be "cogent and compelling" when compared to other plausible
20 2
inferences.
i.The Jade Falcon Hypothetical
To best illustrate the new standard, the Court considered a scenario
posed by Justice Scalia in his concurrence. 20 3 Justice Scalia posed the

following problem: "If a jade falcon were stolen from a room to which
only A and B had access, could it possibly be said there was a "strong
inference" that B was the thief? ' 20 4 The majority opinion relied on tort

197. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-10 (noting the failure of the Seventh Circuit to compare
opposing inferences).
198. Id. at 2510 ("The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum."). Justice
Alito, at oral argument, demonstrated this point when he said:
You see somebody ... walking in the direction of Capitol Hill .... You could draw
an inference that the person is coming to the Supreme Court. If there are no other
buildings in Washington, that would be a strong inference. But don't you also have to
consider the inference that the person is going to the Capitol, the person is going to the
Library of Congress, the person is going to some other location up here? You have to
consider all the inferences that you can draw from the facts.
Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 36-37.
199. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2510 ("The inference that the defendant acted with scienter need
not be irrefutable, i.e., of the "smoking-gun" genre, or even the 'most plausible of competing
inferences."').
200. Id.
201. Id. ("Recall in this regard that § 21D(b)'s pleading requirements are but one constraint
among many... to screen out frivolous suits.").
202. Id. Even at oral argument, the Justices seemed adamant that a reasonable inference did
not capture Congress' strong inference requirement. See Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra
note 133, at 35-37.
203. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2510 n.5. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's analysis of a stolen jade falcon with two equally likely suspects and how
"strong inference" is determined in such a context).
204. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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principles, stating, "law enforcement officials as well as the owner of
the precious falcon would find the inference of guilt as to B quite
strong-certainly strong enough to warrant further investigation.
Indeed, an inference, at least as likely as competing inferences can, in
205
some cases, warrant recovery."
ii. Competing Inferences Sometimes Warrant Recovery: Summers v.
Tice
Interestingly, the Court relied on the classic tort case of Summers v.
Tice to further justify its holding. 20 6 In Summers, the plaintiff was
hunting with the two defendants. 20 7 The plaintiff was proceeding up a
hill with the two defendants in the rear, placing them at the points of a
triangle. 20 8 When a quail was flushed, both defendants shot, and the
plaintiff was injured. 20 9 The trial court entered judgment against both
defendants. 2 10
The California Supreme Court affirmed judgment
against both defendants, despite the fact that the plaintiff could not

prove which defendant actually caused the injury. 211 The California

Supreme Court justified holding both defendants liable because of the

practical unfairness of denying the injured person redress simply
because he could not prove how much damage each did while both of
2 12
the parties were negligent.
In Tellabs, the Supreme Court relied on Summers to support its
argument that the inference in pleading scienter need only be as strong
as countervailing inferences. 2 13 If an inference that is at least as likely
205. Id. at 2510 n.5 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-5 (Cal. 1948). Yet, the concurring
Justice Scalia replied that even a strong possibility is still merely a possibility and does not
amount to the "strong inference" required by the PSLRA. Id. at 2513. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia also said allowing someone to draw such an inference would contravene the
wisdom of the old maxim, "no man ought to be a judge of his own cause." Id. at 2513 n.*(2007).
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia further criticized the majority's reliance on a single
committee report of the House of Representatives and on Summers v. Tice. Id.
206. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2510 n.5. See infra notes 207-208 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's reliance on Summers v. Tice).
207. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1,1 (Cal. 1948); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Evidence,
Unfairness,and Market Share Liability: A Comment on Geistfeld, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 126, 127
(2006) (discussing Summers as a justification for alternative market share liability).
208. Summers, 199 P.2d at I ("The view of defendants with reference to Plaintiff was
unobstructed and they knew his location... [when defendants shot they] were seventy-five yards
from plaintiff.").
209. Id.
210. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Id.
211. Id. at 5.
212. Id. at 3-4.
213. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 n.5 (2007) (citing
Summers, 199 P.2d at 3-5).
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as competing inferences can warrant recovery in some cases, then2 14it
should certainly satisfy a heightened pleading requirement.
Comparably then, the "strong inference" standard is not more
demanding than the "preponderance 15of the evidence" standard used in
2
negligence cases, such as Summers.
iii. Justice Scalia's Concurrence: More Plausible
In Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, on the other hand, he proposed
an even more stringent standard.2 16 He advocated that on the balance,
the inference of scienter should be more plausible than the inference of
innocence. 2 17 Justice Scalia's concurrence criticized the majority by
noting that the policy concerns present in Summers, such as practical
unfairness, are not always present in securities fraud actions. He stated
that:
[Summers] represented a "relaxation" of "such proof as is ordinarily
required" to succeed in a negligence action .... . There is no
indication that the statute at issue here was meant to relax the ordinary
rule under which a tie goes to the defendant. To the contrary, it
explicitly18 strengthens that rule by extending it to the pleading stage of
2
a case.
iv. Justice Alito's Concurrence: Must Courts Consider Facts Not
Alleged With Particularity?
Justice Alito concurred, aligning himself with Justice Scalia, arguing
that the inference of scienter should be more likely than opposing
inferences. 2 19 Alito argued that the strong inference standard should be
more closely aligned with standards used at summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law stages. 220 He reasoned that Congress most
214. See id. (allowing a complaint to survive if the alleged inference is at least as likely as
opposing inferences); Summers, 199 P.2d at 1 (finding liability under a preponderance of the
evidence standard because it is equally likely defendants were culpable).
215. Compare Summers, 199 P.2d at I (finding liability for both defendants on a
preponderance of the evidence standard) with Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2510 n.5 (at least as likely to
prevail).
216. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia further noted that "'[i]nference'
connotes 'belief in what is inferred" and that a strong belief in the jade falcon hypothetical would
be impossible. Id. at 2513 n*.
218. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
219. Id. at 2515-16 (Alito, J., concurring). It is interesting to note that Justice Alito voted
twenty percent more often with Justice Scalia in this term of the Court than former Justice
O'Connor ever did. Coyle, supra note 1I.
220. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). See also Tellabs, Tr. of Oral
Argument, supra note 133, at 8-9 (Justice Alito suggesting the standard at the pleading stage
should have to be the same as the standard at the summary judgment stage).
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likely intended to adopt a known standard as opposed to an unknown
standard; because the summary judgment and judgment as a matter of
law standards are known standards, Congress most likely intended to
adopt a pleading standard similar to those. 22 1 The majority responded
to this argument by noting that those other standards are used in the
context of discovery, which is not the case when ruling on the
222
sufficiency of a pleading.
Justice Alito addressed an issue largely ignored by the majority by
arguing that only facts alleged with particularity can be considered
when balancing inferences. 2 23 He reasoned that because the statute
requires facts to be stated with particularity, 2 24 a strong inference must
arise from those facts. 225 According to Justice Alito, determining
whether a strong inference exists without facts stated with particularity
circumvents the entire purpose of the particularity requirement-to
prevent plaintiffs from using vague or general allegations. 226 The
majority held that omissions and ambiguities can create inferences
opposing the plaintiffs allegations; Justice Alito argued that they
should not enter the balance at all. 227
v. Justice Stevens in Dissent: Advocating Probable Cause
Justice Stevens' dissent conceded Justice Alito's point that Congress
likely intended to adopt a standard for determining "strong inference"
grounded in a familiar legal concept. 228 Unlike Justices Alito and
Scalia, however, Justice Stevens argued that the standard should be
229
similar to the probable cause standard in criminal proceedings.
221. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 2510 n.5 (Justice Ginsburg writing for the majority). "[T]he test at each stage is
measured against a different backdrop." Id.
223. Id. at 2515-16 (Alito, J., concurring); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(I) (requiring
plaintiffs in securities fraud actions to allege facts giving rise to information and belief with
particularity).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(I) ("[If an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made
on information or belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief
is formed.").
225. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).
226. Id. Justice Alito noted that "the particularity requirement is thus stripped of all meaning"
under the majority's opinion. Id.
227. Id. at 2511, 2516.
228. See id. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Congress] implicitly delegated significant
lawmaking authority to the Judiciary in determining how [the] standard should operate in
practice.... In addition to the benefit of its grounding in an already familiar legal concept, using
a probable cause standard would avoid . . . [forcing a court to] 'take into account plausible
opposing inferences."') (citing id. at 2509).
229. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
There are times when an inference can easily be deemed strong without any need to
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Justice Stevens reasoned that just as citizens suspected of criminal
activity can be subject to search only after a finding of probable cause,
so too should defendants in a securities fraud action be forced to
produce documents for discovery only after a finding of probable
cause. 230 Justice Stevens reasoned that the probable cause standard has
the added benefit of being a concept familiar to judges and thus easier to
23 1
administer.
2. The Majority Refutes Seventh Amendment Concerns
The second major issue that the Supreme Court's opinion addressed
was the Seventh Circuit's concern that a comparative assessment of
plausible inferences would infringe upon the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial.23 2 The Supreme Court dispensed with this concern by
holding that a comparative assessment of plausible inferences, while
constantly assuming the plaintiff's allegations to be true, does not
infringe on the Seventh Amendment. 233 The Court cited several gatekeeping functions of the judiciary that do not violate the Seventh
Amendment, such as admitting expert testimony, judgment as a matter
of law, and summary judgment. 234 The Court further noted that
Congress, as the creator of federal claims, has the power to determine
pleading requirements. 2 35 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority,
weigh competing inferences ... if a known drug dealer exits a building ... carrying a
suspicious package, a judge could draw a strong inference that the individual was
involved in the... drug transaction.
Id. Under Justice Stevens' standard he would have found scienter for the defendants. Id; see also
Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 7, 44 (Stevens, J.) (questioning the percentage
quantity of "strong inference"). But see Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 8
(Scalia, J.) (saying that in a criminal case the person seeking the action is a government officer
presumptively acting out of no selfish motives whereas, in a civil case as here, there is a serious
concern of selfish motive).
230. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2511 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens advocated his probable cause standard,
thus avoiding the weighing of inferences altogether. Id. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 2511-12 (majority opinion).
234. Id. at 2512 n.8 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993);
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 321 (1967); Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Eng'g
Co., 243 U.S. 273, 278 (1917)).
235. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512.
Congress, as creator of federal statutory claims, has power to prescribe what must be
pleaded to state the claim, just as it has power to determine what must be proved to
prevail on the merits. It is the federal lawmaker's prerogative, therefore, to allow,
disallow, or shape the contours of-including the pleading and proof requirements
for-§10(b) private actions. No decision of this Court questions that authority in
general, or suggests, in particular, that the Seventh Amendment inhibits Congress from
establishing whatever pleading requirements it finds appropriate for federal statutory
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affirmed that after the judge makes a pleading determination, the case
will still fall properly within the scope of "the jury's authority to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve genuine issues of fact, and make the
23 6
ultimate determination" of, in this case, scienter.
The Court pointed to its opinion in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United
States to support its position. 23 7 At issue in Fidelity was a rule adopted
by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia requiring a defendant
in a contract action to file an affidavit specifically stating the grounds
for his defense. 2 38 The Fidelity Court said the purpose of the rule was
to prevent vexatious delays where there is no defense. 2 39 In Fidelity,
the Court characterized the affidavit requirement as merely a "means of
making an issue." 240 Once the issue is made, then the right of trial by
jury attaches. 24 1 The Court analogized securities cases by saying that
the plaintiff only need satisfy the "prescribed means of making an
issue," and only then will the jury trial right attach. 242 The concurring
Justices and Justice Stevens in dissent did not address the Seventh
24 3
Amendment issue.
3. Vacated and Remanded
After announcing the new standard, the Supreme Court did not apply
it. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's decision,
rejecting the reasonable person standard, and remanded the case so that
the Seventh Circuit could consider it in accord with the Court's new

claims.
Id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) and Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)); see also
Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 30 (Scalia, J.) (discussing Congress' enactment
of entry qualifications for getting into court such as allegations of diversity for federal cases
relying on diversity jurisdiction).
236. Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2513.
237. Id.
238. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 318 (1902). Specifically the
contract action was an ex contractu action. Id. Ex contractu is Latin meaning "from a contract."
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239. Fidelio,, 187 U.S. at 320. This concern is comparable to the Court's concern of
preventing "vexatious discovery" in securities fraud cases. Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2508 (quoting
Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)).
240. Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320.
241. Id.
242. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2513 (quoting Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320).
243. Justice Stevens argued that his approach did not require the weighing of inferences and
thus avoided a Seventh Amendment problem altogether. Id. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also supra Part IV.D (discussing the constitutionality of Justice Stevens' approach).
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standard. 2 44 The Supreme Court set out to reconcile the circuit
differences as well as come up with a rule addressing the concerns of
vexatious securities litigation. 245 As Part IV will explore, the Court's
decision resolves the circuit split, 24 6 but is based on unsubstantiated
concerns of excessive and abusive securities litigation 24 7 and infringes
on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 4 8

IV. ANALYSIS
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court's standard in Tellabs unifies the9
24
pleading standard under the PSLRA among the federal courts.
However, the Court's preoccupation with frivolous securities litigation
and exponential costs does not warrant the imposition of the heightened
standard adopted by the Court. 250 The Court's exacting pleading
requirement may in fact perpetuate exponential costs of litigation rather
than curb them. 25 1 Moreover, the Court's concern seems one-sided in
that it focuses on preventing meritless litigation, but fails to consider the
impact of the pleading requirement on merited litigation. 252 Lastly, the
Court's standard is an infringement on the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial.25 3

244. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2513; see infra Part V.B (exploring the remanded Tellabs case).
The Seventh Circuit decided the Tellabs case on January 17, 2008, in favor of the plaintiffs.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., No. 04-1687, 2008 WL 151180 (7th Cir. Jan. 17,
2008).
245. See supra notes 187-190, 193, 201 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
concern with frivolous and nuisance-driven securities litigation).
246. See infra Part IV.A (examining how the Court established a uniform rule and clarified
the split among the circuits regarding whether nonculpable inferences are considered and weighed
in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
247. See infra Part IV.B (detailing the drop in securities filings, discussing that discovery
abuse is not as widespread as the misperception of it is, and asserting that a heightened standard
may increase litigation costs).
248. See infra Part IV.C (arguing the Court's standard requires courts to resolve disputed
questions of fact).
249. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506; see infra Part IV.A (discussing the Supreme Court's newly
announced standard).
250. See infra Part IV.B (saying that the rate of securities filings are declining, discovery
abuse is not a cause of concern, and a heightened pleading standard may in fact increase litigation
costs).
251. See infra Part IV.B.l.iii (explaining how a more rigid standard can exacerbate litigation
expenses).
252. See infra Part IV.B.3 (arguing that the Court fails to preserve meritorious claims because
a higher pleading standard will further result in the dismissal of merited claims).
253. See infra Part IV.C (demonstrating how the Court's rule violates the Seventh
Amendment right to ajury trial).
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A. A Strong Inference Strongly Defined

As this Part will demonstrate, the Court's rule elucidates a clear
guideline for lower courts in determining scienter. 25 4 The Tellabs
ruling primarily sets a clear standard for courts in assessing the
adequacy of an allegation of "strong inference," 25 5 and requires lower
courts to weigh inferences of scienter against opposing nonculpable
inferences. 2 56 This Part will explore the questions left open by the
Court's decision, namely, how courts should deal with an aggregate of
inferences and how the particularity requirement fits in with the scienter
257
determination.
258
1. The Tie Goes to the Runner

The decision sets forth a few clear guideposts on the question of what
a court should consider when weighing competing inferences. 259 First,
the inferences need not be "of the smoking gun genre" or even the most

254. See infra Part IV.A.I (saying that in the event of a tie over competing culpable and
nonculpable inferences, the plaintiff prevails).
255. For recent cases employing the Tellabs rule, see, e.g., ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enter., Inc. Fin. Inv. Litig.,
No. 2:03-md-1565, 2007 WL 2331929, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2007); In re Loudeye Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. C06-1442MJP, 2007 WL 2404626, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2007); see also
Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 41 (Scalia, J.) (searching for a clear established
standard to guide courts in their analysis); Peter Lattman, Tellabs: Securities Lawyers React,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 21, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/2l /tellabs-securitieslawyers-react/ (quoting David Kistenbroker, of the law firm Katten Muchin, as saying, "[The
standard] really only serves to more clearly articulate the law as put on the books by Congress.").
256. See Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 551 (5th
Cir. 2007) (saying Tellabs requires courts to engage in a weighing of allegations to determine
scienter); In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Fin. Inv. Litig., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2007 WL
2331929, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2007) (weighing an inference of scienter where the defendant
improperly used incorrect accounting methods with the nonculpable inference that the defendant
auditor did not know the company was selling securities to the public); see also Pete Yost, Strict
Standard Set on InvestorSuits, USA TODAY, June 22, 2007, http://www.usatoday.cornnews/
washington/2007-06-21-2376334548_x.htm (quoting Bruce Vanyo, an attorney who drafted the
PSLRA, as saying that "a number of district courts have simply not engaged in a serious
consideration of competing inferences").
257. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing questions remaining after Tellabs concerning the
application of the rule).
258. See Commc'ns Workers of Am. Plan for Employees' Pensions and Death Benefits v.
CSK Auto Corp., No. CV06-1503-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 2808652, at *2-*3 (D. Ariz Sept. 27,
2007) ("a tie goes to the Plaintiff'); Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1102,
1116-17 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (saying investors satisfied the scienter requirement because the
inference of scienter was at least as compelling as the competing inference).
259. See 26 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Tellabs Decision, in SECURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES
§3:11:80 (2007) (describing the likely impact of the Tellabs decision).
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plausible of inferences. 260 For instance, in Tellabs, the plaintiff did not
need to produce a videotaped statement or a signed inter-office
memorandum from Notebaert saying he knew of the channel stuffing
practices and encouraged these practices to inflate revenue. 26 1 Second,
omissions and ambiguities in the complaint weigh against finding an
inference of scienter.2 62 Even though a plaintiff is not required to have
the "smoking gun," a complaint that is too vague or ambiguous may not
survive a 12(b)(6) motion. 263 Third, evidence of motive, such as
personal financial gain, weighs in favor of finding scienter, but the
absence of such an allegation is not fatal.2 6 4 For instance, if the
defendant sells all his stock immediately before the market gets wind of
the bad news, this weighs in favor of a culpable scienter. 26 5 However,
of motive will not automatically defeat
the Court stated that the absence
2 66
an inference of scienter.
Generally, the Tellabs decision is typecast by commentators as
injurious to plaintiffs, 267 as any heightened pleading standard will be
considered an obstacle to plaintiffs. Thus, the issue centers on the
260. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007), rejecting
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (allowing courts to consider only the
most plausible inferences of the plaintiff).
261. Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2510.
262. Id. at 2511.
263. Id.; see Key Equity Investors, Inc. v. Sel-Leb Mktg. Inc., No. 06-1052, 2007 WL
2510385, at * 5 (3d Cir. Sept. 6, 2007) (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in a securities fraud
action where the plaintiff relied on conclusory allegations rather than specified allegations).
264. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2511; see In re BearingPoint, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-cv-454,
2007 WL 2713906, at *12 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2007) (considering motive as a factor weighing
against scienter).
265. See Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 552-53
(5th Cir. 2007) (saying where a defendant CEO sells stock before disclosure of bad news to the
market, this weighs in favor of finding scienter); see also Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 501
F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116-17 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (stating an allegation that a defendant sold stock
prior to a disclosure of a prior misrepresentation counts in favor of finding scienter).
266. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2511 ("While it is true that motive can be a relevant
consideration, and personal financial gain may weigh heavily in favor of a scienter inference, we
agree with the Seventh Circuit that the absence of a motive allegation is not fatal.").
267. See Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-five Defenses Securities Litigators
Need to Know, 62 BuS. LAW. 1281, 1362-63 (Aug. 2007) (listing the Tellabs rule as its own
defensive device securities litigators can use to quash securities fraud actions before trial); Robert
Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, WASH.
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpPOST, June 22, 2007, at DO],
dyn/content/article/2007/06/21/AR2007062100803.html ("[The Tellabs decision] is part of a
pattern by which the justices have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue corporations or win
substantial damage awards."); Stephen Labaton, Investor's Suits Face Higher Bar, Justices Rule,
N.Y TIMES, June 22, 2007, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/washington/
22bizcourt.html ("[The new standard] makes it easier for companies and their executives to get
shareholder complaints dismissed.").
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extent of the inhibitor. The Tellabs rule sets up a baseball scenario
whereby "the tie goes to the runner." 268 The Court's jade falcon
hypothetical also illustrates this principle. In the hypothetical, a jade
falcon is stolen from a room to which only A and B have access.
According to the Court's standard, we can draw a strong inference that
either A or B took the jade falcon. 269 The Court only requires that the
270
inference be at least as compelling as opposing inferences.
268. See Lattman, supra note 255 (quoting Joe Grundfest, Securities Law Professor at
Stanford Law School, as saying, "[T]he opinion unfortunately leaves room for lower courts to
reason "gee, the story in support of scienter seems as cogent as the story in opposition to scienter
and that's good enough." The danger then is that the language devolves into the equivalent of
baseball's rule of "a tie goes to the runner."); see also Roger Parloff, Supreme Court Deals Blow
to Securities Class Actions, 8-1, FORTUNE,
June
21,
2007,
available at
http://legalpad.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2007/06/2 1/supreme-court-deals-blow-to-securities-classactions-8-1/ (quoting Sean Coffey, a plaintiffs' class action lawyer of Bernstein Litowitz &
Grossman, as saying, "[N]ow in the event of a tie, the plaintiff wins."). But see Michael J.
Kaufman, Mission Implausible: The Supreme Court Replaces Federal Pleading Rules with
Unfounded Economic Assumptions (Spring 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (arguing that when Tellabs and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), are read
together, they substantially raise the traditional pleading requirement, limiting irrational economic
inferences at the pleading stage).
269. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text (describing the Court's volley on the
jade falcon hypothetical).
270. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-10. Had the Court adopted Justice Scalia's approach, this
would be insufficient. Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating that the inference must be
more plausible than an innocent inference). But see In re Bayou Hedge Fund Litig., No. 06MDL-1755, 2007 WL 2319127, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2007) (saying Tellabs did not change
the Second Circuit's requirement and that the Second Circuit now requires the allegations of
recklessness to be greater than allegations of garden-variety fraud and the inference of
recklessness must be at least as compelling as opposing nonculpable inferences). Moreover, the
Court's announced standard in Tellabs is difficult to reconcile with traditional conceptions of
procedural motions. Kaufman, supra note 268 (arguing that Tellabs and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
have raised Rule 8(a)'s traditionally minimalist requirement by stripping plaintiffs of the benefit
of perceived unreasonable economic assumptions at the pleading stage); see Coyle, supra note 11
(arguing a significant theme of this term of the Court was to use technical-procedural tools, such
as standing, statutes of limitations, and pleading requirements, to narrow access to the courts); see
also Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., No. Civ.A.I:06-CV-1 1510, 2007 WL 2254693, at *3 (N.D.
Ga. July 18, 2007) (securities fraud class action saying the Twombly decision heightened the
pleading standard for complaints attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Rule 8(a) traditionally
requires that a plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed only if there is no set of facts entitling the
plaintiff to relief. FED. R. Civ. P. 8; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957); see, e.g.,
Chalmers v. Lane, No. Civ.A.3:03CV1268-BH, 2003 WL 23109794, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23,
2003) ("'Thus the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the
allegations in the complaint."'); McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 997 (10th Cir.
2002) ("We will affirm a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 'only when it appears that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle the plaintiff to
relief."'). This "no set of facts" language was the gold standard used to assess the adequacy of
complaints:
The "notice pleading" theory espoused by the Court in Conley became the prevailing
standard by which all federal complaints were to be gauged. In fact between 1957 and
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To put this in the context of securities regulation, assume a plaintiff
in a lOb-5 action alleges that the defendant CEO sold all of his shares
in the defendant company during the class period immediately before
the disclosure of an earnings restatement revealing earlier
misrepresentations. 27 1 Assume also that the defendant CEO's stock sale
272 If
came in lock-step with his resignation, which is common practice.
the defendant files a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, should the complaint
prevail? 27 3 If the plausible inference of scienter arising from the CEO
2 74
selling all his shares prior to the disclosure of an earnings restatement
is weighed against the fact that the sale of a CEO's selling stock is
common practice upon resignation, 27 5 these two competing inferences

1994 Conley was cited more than 1700 times in opinions published by the courts of
appeals, which is not to mention Conley citations by the district courts. It is not
exaggerating to say that Conley is the most important federal decision on pleading of
the twentieth century. By this writer's review it has never been directly challenged by
a Supreme Court Justice.
Paul J. McArdle, A Short and Plain Statement: The Significance of Leatherman v. Tarrant
County, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 19, 26 (1994). However, on a 12(b)(6) motion, the usual
maxim that a plaintiffs complaint will prevail unless there is no set of facts entitling him to relief
no longer seems to be the case as the Twombly decision effectively "retired" Conley v. Gibson:
[A]fter puzzling the profession for fifty years, [Conley's] famous observation has
earned its retirement. The phrase ["no set of facts"] is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by a showing of any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. Thus, the two decisions, Tellabs and Twombly, serve to heighten
Rule 8(a)'s short and plain statement requirement. Kaufman, supra note 268; see Kahn v. NYU
Med. Ctr., No. 06 CIV 13455 LAP, 2007 WL 2000072, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2007)
(interpreting Tellabs and Twombly as restating the proposition that a court must accept all factual
allegations as true when faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). It is important to note however that
a majority of the recent lower federal court decisions, when citing both Tellabs and Twombly, do
not interpret the two in conjunction with one another. See, e.g., Transit Rail, LLC v. Marsala, No.
05-CV-0564(C), 2007 WL 2089273, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007); S.E.C. v. Boling, No. 061329(RMC), 2007 WL 2059744, at *3 (D.D.C. July 13, 2007); In re Crude Oil Commodity Litig.,
No. 06 Civ. 6677(NRB), 2007 WL 1946553, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007).
271. These facts are similar to the facts of Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec.
Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2007).
272. See id. at 553-54. It is important to note that the resignation could have come because
the CEO knew the stock drop was coming. This illustrates the problem of courts weighing
inferences absent any kind of facts disclosed from discovery. See infra notes 346-350 and
accompanying text (arguing that discovery is necessary to allow plaintiffs and defendants to
realistically assess the strength of their claims and defenses).
273. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
274. See, e.g., Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116-17 (S.D. Ohio
2007) (noting that an allegation that a defendant sold stock prior to an unfavorable sales
announcement weighs in favor of finding scienter).
275. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund, 497 F.3d at 553 (saying that a CEO's stock sale coming
in lock-step with his resignation weighs against scienter).
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roughly should come out equal (a fifty-fifty ratio).27 6 Under the Tellabs
decision, where one competing inference is at least as likely as the
other, the plaintiffs complaint should survive. 2 77 In sum, a tie goes to
27 8
the plaintiff.
2. Vagaries in the Tellabs Rule
Despite the seeming simplicity of the rule, there is still some concern
that the Court's "at least as compelling as opposing inferences" standard
provides little more clarity than Congress' language of "strong
inference." 2 79 For example, the rule may be difficult to apply where
more than just one nonculpable inference competes with a culpable
inference. 2 80 Suppose the inference that the defendant acted with
scienter is 40%, a nonculpable inference likewise is 40%, and a third
alternative accounts for the remaining 20%.28 1 Assuming the third
alternative is a nonculpable inference as well, two possible
interpretations emerge. First, the inference of scienter at 40% is at least
as likely as the second nonculpable inference, thus it is cogent and
compelling (a forty-forty ratio). The inference of 40% probability is
more than likely than the third nonculpable inference, and therefore is
also cogent and compelling (a forty-twenty ratio). 2 82 Yet the culpable

inference is only 40% likely compared to nonculpable inferences
aggregated at 60% (a forty-sixty ratio); thus, it is not cogent and

276. See id. (noting that a suspicious stock sale weighs in favor of scienter and that selling
shares upon resignation weighs against).
277. See Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509-10 (2007) ("A complaint will survive, we hold, only
if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged."); see also Commc'ns Workers of
Am. Plan for Employees' Pensions and Death Benefits v. CSK Auto Corp., No. CV06-1503PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 2808652, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007) (requiring an inference of scienter
to be only at least as likely as nonculpable inferences).
278. See supra notes 197, 204-204, 268-277 and accompanying text (describing how the
plaintiff prevails when two inferences are equally likely).
279. See Lattman, supra note 255 (quoting William McGuinness as saying, "[I]t's not clear
that the new 'cogent and at least as compelling as any other inference' standard will add any
greater clarity."); see also In re Faro Techs. Sec. Litig., No. 6:05-cv-1810-Orl-22DAB, 2007
WL 2744610, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2007) (interpreting Tellabs to weigh only nonculpable
inferences offered by the defendants, not drawn by the court); Key Equity Investors, Inc. v. SelLeb Mktg. Inc., No.06-1052, 2007 WL 2510385, at *6 (3d Cir. Sept. 6, 2007) (Garth, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the facts, when taken together, do establish a strong inference).
280. See John C. Coffee, Jr., FederalPleading StandardsAfter 'Tellabs,' 'Bell Atlantic,' 238
N.Y.L.J. 5 (July 19, 2007) (discussing law professors' "tortured hypotheticals based on the
Tellabs test").
281. Id.
282. Id.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

compelling. 28 3 This scenario encourages defendants to come up with a
host of alternative explanations for the alleged fraudulent action, so that
they might aggregate inferences greater than 50%.284
Further, Justice Alito's argument that only facts alleged with
particularity must be weighed so as not to circumvent the particularity
2 86
pleading requirement 28 5 also points out a vagary in the Court's rule.
Justice Alito compellingly argues that a court must only consider those
facts alleged with particularity in order to give purpose to the statutory
language. 287 The majority briefly noted that vague allegations weigh
against an inference of scienter. 28 8 Yet Justice Alito's argument is more
forceful than this; namely, he argues that vague allegations should not
even enter into the balance because they fail the particularity

283. Id; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-10
(2007) (requiring inferences of scienter to be at least as likely for a plaintiff to sufficiently state a
claim in a securities fraud Rule lOb-5 action).
284. Beth Bar, Raising the Bar: Attorneys Tailor Strategy To High Court Rulings, 238
N.Y.L.J. 3 (July 12, 2007) (quoting Brad S. Karp as saying the nature of motion practice will
change in securities litigation as defendants will now submit "a broad array of materials so that
district courts can consider the entire record to determine whether it is more likely than not that
scienter is present."). See supra notes 280-283 and accompanying text (exploring possible
interpretations a court may adopt when faced with multiple competing inferences).
285. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2515-16 (Alito, J., concurring). This point was also raised at oral
argument. See Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 13-15 (Scalia, J. and Kennedy,
J.) (questioning whether an allegation just asserting a CEO had knowledge would be sufficient).
But see Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Corruption, and the Complicity of
Courts and Legislatures 40 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (disagreeing
that while the particularity provision is on its face a reasonable one, its application is rather
muddied because the question of "how much particularity need be pleaded without the benefit of
discovery" is often litigated).
286. David Stras, A Lingering Thought on Tellabs, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BLOG, June 23, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/06/
ajlingering-tho.html (stating that the Court has left open the question of whether nonparticularized allegations can be included in a court's assessment of whether a "strong inference"
in fact exists).
287. Compare Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2515-16 (Alito, J., concurring) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)
(2000) (requiring allegations of securities fraud based on information and belief to be alleged
with particularity) with Murdock, supra note 285 (arguing that the PSLRA's particularity
provision provides no clear guidance as to what suffices as a "particularized" allegation).
288. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2511.
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the
requirement. 28 9 Nonetheless, the Court has not specifically29resolved
0
problem.
the
with
grapple
to
courts
lower
the
leaving
issue,
B. The Court's Concern with Frivolous Litigation Does Not Warrant
an Exacting PleadingStandard
Not only do questions persist about the application of the rule but the
underlying justification for the standard-the desire to stop strike
suits-does not warrant an exacting pleading requirement. 29 1 One of
the primary problems with the Tellabs decision is its preoccupation with
frivolous strike suits and excessive discovery costs. 29 2 First, this
concern is largely unsubstantiated. 29 3 Second, the PSLRA contains
other provisions better suited to address this concern. 2 94 Third, the
PSLRA was enacted to stem frivolous strike suits as well as preserve
meritorious claims. 29 5 It is not designed solely to wipe out strike suits,

289. See id. at 2516 (stating that the Court's interpretation contradicts clear statutory language
preventing a plaintiff from using vague or general allegations in order to get past a motion to
dismiss).
290. See Richard H. Zelichov et al., Tellabs: The Debate Over Competing Inferences Will
Continue, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 508-11 (2007) (discussing
issues left open from the Tellabs decision). A related issue left open by Tellabs is its impact on
confidential informants. Compare Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir.
2007) (discounting allegations derived from information provided by confidential sources
altogether saying such information is inherently too vague to be considered at all), with Cent.
Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 2007)
(acknowledging information derived from confidential sources where there is at least some
specificity).
291. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that a heightened standard is not merited because the
concern of rising securities litigation costs is unsubstantiated, other existing PSLRA provisions
are more apt at dealing with concerns of strike suits, and a heightened pleading standard would
disrupt the balance between preserving meritorious claims and dismissing frivolous ones).
292. For example, the Court's second line in the decision is that private securities fraud
actions, if employed abusively, impose substantial costs on companies. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at
2504. The Court also discusses the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirement as designed to
curb vexatious discovery and targeting deep-pocketed defendants. Id. at 2508. Justice Stevens
likewise said the basic purpose of the heightened pleading requirement was to protect defendants
from discovery costs and strike suits. Id. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At oral argument,
Justice Stevens said the real issue is not whether the complaint is trial worthy, but rather
discovery worthy. Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 47 (Stevens, J.)
293. See infra Part IV.B.l (explaining how the concern with rising securities litigation costs is
unsubstantiated because securities fraud action filings are declining, fewer securities issuers are
being sued, and fears of discovery abuse are based on prevalent isperceptions rather than data).
294. See infra Part IV.B.2 (describing other existing PSLRA provisions, such as the stay of
discovery provision or enhanced Rule 11 sanctions, as more capable of dealing with concerns of
strike suits).
295. See infra Part IV.B.3 (describing the delicate balance between dismissing nuisance
filings and preserving meritorious claims).
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but rather to achieve this equilibrium. 2 96 The Court has failed to
297
establish a pleading rule that strikes a similar balance.
1. The Court's Concern with Rising Securities Litigation Costs is
Unsubstantiated
There are several reasons why the Court's concern over frivolous
securities fraud class actions is unfounded.2 9 8 First, securities filings in
general are on the decline. 2 99 Second, the general fear of excessive and
abusive discovery tactics is based on common misperceptions rather
than hard evidence. 30 0 Lastly, a heightened pleading standard is not
tailored to address the Court's concerns. 30 1 In fact, a higher standard
may result in a circuitous problem whereby litigation costs actually
30 2
rise.
i. The Rate of Securities Filings is on the Decline
Overall, securities fraud claims are being filed less and less
frequently. 30 3 The first half of 2007 marked the fourth consecutive six30 4
month period where securities class actions were below average.

There were only fifty-nine filings in the first half of 2007 compared
296. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the PSLRA's twin aims of preventing nuisance filings
while preserving investors' meritorious claims).
297. See infra Part IV.B.3 (arguing that a heightened pleading standard results in the dismissal
of claims based on hyper-technica pleading rules rather than the merits).
298. See infra Part IV.B.L.i-IV.B.l.iii (discussing the problems with the Tellabs decision).
299. See infra Part IV.B.1.i (discussing the declining rate of securities fraud action filings
after the PSLRA).
300. See infra Part IV.B.l.ii (arguing that the prevalence of discovery abuse is not based on
actual data, but common misperceptions that the discovery process is abused).
301. See infra Part IV.B.1.iii (stating that an exacting pleading standard will increase litigation
costs as plaintiffs will compensate for the increased risk of dismissal by bringing suits with higher
damages).
302. See infra Part 1V.B.l.iii (illustrating how an exacting pleading standard may result in
higher litigation costs).
303. See infra notes 304-308 and accompanying text (describing the statistical drop in the
number of securities class action filings since the enactment of the PSLRA and concluding that
there is a trend of less securities fraud actions being filed).
304. Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 2; see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge
Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why do We
Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 S.M.U. L. REv. 1405, 1407 (2002) (discussing the general decline in
all trials across the country as a syndrome characterized by a surge in private dispute resolution).
Cornerstone Research reported that filings increased from 116 in 2006 to 166 in 2007.
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings: 2007: A Year in Review 2 (2007),
available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YlR2007.pdf (noting that the maximum dollar
losses in the first half of 2007 amounted $69 billion) [hereinafter Cornerstone, 2007: Year in
Review]. This rise was due in large part to the subprime mortgage crisis and increased stock
volatility. Id. Moreover, this rise in 2007 still is 14% below the average for the prior ten years.
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with the average semi-annual filing rate of 101 as measured between
1996 and 2005.305 Furthermore, there has been a general decline in
securities fraud class action filings since the second half of 2005,306
with the rate decreasing by approximately 40% compared to statistics
from 1996.307 Even though one research institute predicts filings for the
second half of 2007 may rise, this slight rise still makes it unlikely that
the suits will pick up enough to reverse the general trend of declining
filings. 30 8 Thus, with a general trend of fewer securities fraud
actions
30 9
filed, the threat of in terrorem settlement is not as prevalent.
Not only are actual securities filings decreasing but the overall rate of

securities issuers (corporate defendants) who are being sued has
decreased as well. 3 10 For example, from 1996 to 2005, on average,
2.3% of the companies listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex were
defendants in class action lawsuits. 3 1 1 However, at the start of 2006 and
at the end of the first half of 2007, only 1.6% of these companies were
named as defendants. 3 12 In fact, the annual likelihood of suit has
dropped by 27% since the pre-PSLRA period. 3 13 A study by the
National Economic Research Associates ("NERA") also found that, on

305. Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 2. The sharp increase in 2001 and 2002 reflects
the suits surrounding the initial public offering ("IPO") litigation where virtually every issuer that
went public at the end of the Internet boom was being sued. Perino, supra note 56, at 932. These
suits are different from traditional securities claims because the IPO claims contain allegations
specific to the IPO process itself and not misrepresentation or omission with respect to the issuer.
Id. However, Perino goes on to find that the average number of filings even adjusted for the IPO
cases was still on average higher than pre-PSLRA filings. Id. Nonetheless, as Perino
acknowledges later, the acquisition of more complete data may better explain this increase instead
of an actual increase in filings. Id. at 933.
306. Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 5.
307. Id.
308. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 3. NERA predicts at the close of 2007 there will be a total
of 152 filings, up from the 2006 total of 136. Id. However, this is still below the average amount
of filings between 1995 and 2005, which was 284 filings. Id. At the end of 2007, NERA
reported a total of 198 filings, a growth. Stephanie Plancich, et al., 2007 Year End Update:
Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Actions: Filings Return to 2005 Levels as Subprime Cases
Take Off; Average Settlements Hit New High, NERA Economic Consulting, 1 (Dec. 2007),
available at www.nera.com. This increase in filings is due in large part because of the subprime
mortgage crisis. Id. at 15.
309. See supra notes 304-308 and accompanying text (discussing the statistical drop of
securities class action case filings).
310. Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 6.
311. Id. But see Perino, supra note 56, at 930 (concluding that data as of 2002 was
insufficient to determine whether the PSLRA had affected the total number of issuers sued per
year).
312. Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 6.
313. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 7.
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average, a public corporation faces a lower probability of being sued.3 14
Thus, both the rate of securities claims being filed and the rate of
3 15
corporate defendants being sued is on the decline.
3 16
ii. Fears of Abusive Discovery are Based on General Misperceptions

Congress passed the PSLRA in response to concerns that high
litigation and discovery costs forced parties into settling claims, even
when the claims lacked merit.3 17 In Tellabs, the Court echoed these
concerns of strike suits. 3 18 Specifically, Congress was concerned that
plaintiffs file frivolous lawsuits in an effort to find a sustainable claim,
3 19
not yet alleged in the complaint, through the discovery process.

314. See id. (noting that the average public corporation faces a 6.4% probability that it will
face at least one shareholder class action lawsuit over a five-year period). At the end of 2007,
NERA reported that the rate of issuers rose to 2.19%. Cornerstone, 2007: Year in Review, supra
note 304, at 7. Nevertheless, this is still lower than the all time high of 2.91% or the national tenyear average of 2.27%. Id.
315. See supra notes 304-308, 309-313 and accompanying text (describing the statistical drop
in securities class action filings as well as the statistical drop in the rate of securities issuers being
sued).
316. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1393 (1994) (discussing the myth of discovery abuse).
317. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736 ("According to the general counsel of an investment bank, 'discovery
costs account for roughly 80% of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases"' (citing the
testimony of former SEC Commissioner J. Carter Beese, Jr., Chairman of the Capital Markets
Regulatory Reform Project Center for Strategic and International Studies, before the Securities
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on March 2,
1995)); see also supra notes 51,55-56 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' concern that
securities lawyers were filings strike suits in hopes that corporate defendants would settle rather
than risk other adverse costs).
318. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (stating that the
PSLRA was designed to stem nuisance suits and targeting of deep-pocketed defendants).
Coercive or in terrorem settlements are driven by the time that employees must spend responding
to discovery requests and providing testimony. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995) as reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687. Discovery abuses fall into two categories: (1) excessive discovery
requests used to impose excessive costs (usually utilized by plaintiffs) and (2) resisting legitimate
discovery requests to avoid disclosure or buy time (usually utilized by defendants). Peggy E.
Bruggman, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation: Discovery Reform, Public Law Research
Institute 1 (2004), available at http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/discov.htm; see also Judith
A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV.
785, 799-804 (1998) (discussing the various types of discovery abuses).
319. Congress stated:
The Securities Subcommittee heard testimony that discovery in securities class actions
resembles a fishing expedition. . . . [O]nce suit is filed, the plaintiffs law firm
proceeds to search through all of the company's documents and take endless
depositions for the slightest positive comment which they can claim induced the
plaintiff to invest and any shred of evidence that the company knew a downturn was
coming.
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However, the concern about abusive discovery practices rests on
prevailing sentiments that discovery is excessive and abusive rather than
on actual hard data. 320 Plainly put, discovery abuse in general is not as
prevalent as is widely perceived. 32 1 First, it is important to note that the
actual costs of discovery have been sparsely quantified in empirical
studies. 3 22 Most studies measuring the incidence of discovery survey
only opinions, impressions, or billable hours. 32 3 What is widespread
32 4
however, is the misperception that discovery is excessive and abused.
In fact, relatively little discovery occurs in the course of an ordinary
lawsuit. 325 The first major study into the actual effects of discovery
practice generally found there was no widespread failing in the scope or
availability of discovery. 326 Likewise, a study by the Federal Judicial

S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693.
320. See generally McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318 (tracing discovery studies).
321. For instance:
Frequently the assertions of the extent of discovery abuse do not rest on evidence, but
only cite to another writer making a similar claim or simply make a conclusory
statement that drives [sic] its strength from the fact that it has been repeated so
frequently. Indeed, taking on lives of their own, many of the claims that discovery
abuse is the major cause of delay and expense in the federal system are these kinds of
conclusory assertions.
Bruggman, supra note 318, at 12.
322. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 797. Moreover, the actual quantification of
such costs is extremely difficult. Id. at 797; see also Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)-Much Ado About Nothing, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 703
(1995) (stating that claims of discovery rest on non-evidence and may be exaggerated).
323. Sorenson, supra note 322, at 681 (referencing "[tihe widespread public and professional
perception of a 'litigation explosion' (citing WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991))). One such study found
that, in terms of time, discovery is what lawyers statistically spend most of their time on in the
course of ordinary litigation. David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 72, 91 (1983) (surveying a random sample of cases and lawyers finding lawyers spend
about 16.7% of their time on discovery matters).
324. Bruggman, supra note 318, at 12 ("Most of the information about the discovery process
and its problems is based on opinions and perceptions of those in the legal profession."); see also
McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 788 (noting that early research was based on surveys
and interviews, which are not the most reliable indicators); Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering
Discovery: State ProceduralRules and the Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 610
(2002) (noting that in fewer than 5% of cases studied were more than ten discovery requests
filed).
325. Trubek et al., supra note 323, at 90. In a study covering 1649 civil lawsuits, evenly
divided between federal and state cases, interviews with 1812 attorneys, and questionnaires from
1387 attorneys, no evidence of discovery in over half of the cases was found. Id. at 80-82.
"Pretrial activity is much more common than trials, but modest nonetheless.... We found no
evidence of discovery in over half the cases. Rarely did the records reveal more than five
separate discovery events." Id. at 89-90.
326. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 786-87 (citing the Columbia Project field
survey).
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Center conducted in 1978 examined 3000 cases in six United States
district courts and found that in 53% of cases no discovery was
requested at all, and fewer than 5% of these cases had more than ten
discovery requests. 327 In 72% of the cases, there were no more than
two discovery requests. 328 The National Center for State Courts
likewise conducted a study in state courts and found that only 42% of
the cases in the sample group conducted discovery. 329 Thus, the total

volume of discovery in the course of ordinary cases is generally less
330

than perceived.
Concededly, while discovery in ordinary litigation is not as rampant
as perceived, discovery is more frequent in complex litigation. 33 1 One
study found that securities suits utilized discovery more than typical
litigation scenarios. 332 Nevertheless, securities litigation alone does not
suffer from this increased usage of discovery; among other claims found

to have a higher than normal volume for discovery are trade regulation
claims, tort claims, intellectual property claims, admiralty claims,
contract cases, and antitrust cases. 333 Hence, the concern of33excessive
4
and abusive discovery is not unique to securities fraud claims.
In fact, the idea that discovery has run amok pervades all litigation
scenarios, not just securities litigation. 335 Problems of discovery abuse
were on the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules' docket well before the

327. Bruggman, supra note 318, at 12.
328. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 790.
329. Bruggman, supra note 318, at 13.
330. See supra notes 320-329 and accompanying text (discussing the studies indicating
discovery is not abused as often as perceived). Part of the explanation for this misperception is
that interested parties, such as politicians, lawyers, judges, and insurance companies have
manipulated the media to foster the idea that discovery abuse is real to further their own agendas.
Bruggman, supra note 318, at 10-12.
331. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 791-92.
332. Id. But see BERSHAD ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (arguing that the only reform necessary is
a system promoting "earlier disclosure of documents and other pertinent evidence").
333. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 791-92.
334. See Sorenson, supra note 322, at 697-702 (discussing the misperceptions of discovery
abuse for litigation in general); see also Suja. A. Thomas, The PSLRA's Seventh Amendment
Problem (Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 07-03, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=968893 (proposing an
alternative remedy to stem discovery costs based on the nature of class actions in general and not
specified to securities fraud claims); supra notes 316-330 (discussing the pervasive myth of
discovery abuse).
335. Moskowitz, supra note 324, at 596; see also Higginbotham, supra note 304, at 1416
(stating that the most costly feature of litigation is discovery but acknowledging that the actual
costs of discovery have rarely been quantified in empirical studies).
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passage of the PSLRA.33 6 In fact, even before the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure ("FRCP") were enacted, many feared that excessive
337
discovery would allow plaintiffs to blackmail corporate defendants.
The fear of in terrorem settlements has been around since at least the
1930s.

338

Nor are securities regulations unique in their effort to curb perceived
abusive discovery practices. 339 Since 1970, there has been a general
trend toward containing the scope of discovery. 340 A variety of
procedural remedies found in the FRCP have been crafted to constrain
discovery. 34 1 For instance, a discovery conference intends to narrow
the discovery issues in dispute. 342 Also, FRCP 26(a) no longer provides
for unlimited discovery but instead includes a provision allowing courts
to limit discovery. 34 3 In addition, Rule 26(g) encourages judges to
impose sanctions for discovery abuse. 344
As recently as 1993,
345
introduced.
was
automatic disclosure
Furthermore, despite the potential for abuse during discovery,
discovery serves a vital function in the litigation process. 346 Discovery
is usually necessary in securities fraud actions, where many facts are

336. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 787; see also Sorenson, supra note 322, at 68090 (providing a brief history of discovery abuse).
337. Moskowitz, supra note at 324, at 607 (noting that Representative Robert Dodge and
Senator Claude Pepper were fearful that plaintiffs lawyers would use the threat of discovery to
blackmail corporations even before the rules were completed).
338. See id. (stating that "the rules gave so many tools to the person asserting a claim 'that it
would be cheaper and more to the self-interest of the defendant to settle for less than the cost to
resist"' (quoting Hon. Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental and Practical Objections to the
Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedurefor the District Courts of the United States, 22
A.B.A. J. 809, 809 (1936))).
339. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 786 (tracing the development of the
discovery rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and noting the rising criticism of the
discovery rules in general).
340. Moskowitz, supra note at 324, at 611.
341. See infra notes 342-344 and accompanying text (describing various procedural devices
available in the course of discovery to curb its use).
342. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0.
343. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 cmt. 3; see also In re Top Tankers Inc., No. 06 Civ. 13761 (CM) 2007
WL 4563930, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007) (acknowledging that Congress wanted to protect
corporations from strike suits but nonetheless allowing quick and targeted discovery as the most
efficient means to dispose of the case).
344. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes to the 1993 amendments.
345. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
346. Hickman v. Taylor, 320 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see also Christine L. Childers, Keep on
Pleading: The Co-Existence of Notice Pleading and the New Scope of Discovery Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 677, 687 (Summer 2002)
(discussing the history of the enactment of the FRCP's discovery provisions).
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exclusively in the possession of the defendant. 347 Discovery is designed
to promote resolution of cases on the merits. 34 8 Neither defendants nor
plaintiffs could adequately assess the strength of their own claim or
their opponent's claim absent discovery requests. 349 By allowing
claims to proceed to the discovery stage, settlements on the merits are
more easily facilitated because both parties can adequately assess the
adequacy of their claims. 3 50 Similarly, the practical reality is that the
majority of cases, not just securities claims, settle in the course of
ordinary litigation. 35 1 In a typical litigation scenario, the courts merely
serve as a background for the bargaining between parties to reach a
settlement. 352 Thus, to single out settlements in securities litigation as
nuisance-driven ignores the fact that most litigation is aimed at
353
achieving settlement.
In sum, available hard data suggests that discovery abuse is not
rampant, but the misperception of it is. 3 54 Neither is the perceived
threat of in terrorem settlements any novel development peculiar to
securities fraud class actions alone. 355 These concerns have been
around since the birth of the discovery process. 356 The Court's fear of
allowing fishing expeditions in securities fraud actions further
misperceives the problem of discovery abuse, rather than recognizing
357
discovery as an important litigation tool which is not overused.
347. See Brief for Respondents (No. 06-484), supra note 58, at 34 (noting that "information..
in a securities fraud action ... typically is within the exclusive possession of defendants prior to
discovery").
348. See Moskowitz, supra note 324, at 598 ("The core function of discovery is to seek the
truth so disputes may be settled by what the facts reveal rather than what facts are concealed.").
349. Moskowitz, supra note 324, at 600.
350. D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment,81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 875, 894 (2006) (noting that when enough facts are presented it gives the parties a chance to
weigh in on the merits of the case before trial and thus helps parties reach settlement based on
fuller information).
351. Trubek et al., supra note 323, at 89; see also Higginbotham, supra note 304, at 1408
(noting that trials declined from 12% in 1970 to 3% in 1999).
352. Trubek et al., supra note 323, at 89; see also Higginbotham, supra note 304, at 1416
(noting one of the ambitions of the Federal Rules was to promote full and early disclosure of facts
to facilitate settlement).
353. See supra notes 346-352 and accompanying text (stating that the majority of litigation,
not just securities class actions, results in settlement rather than trial).
354. See supra notes 320-330 and accompanying text (arguing that while discovery abuse is
perceived as rampant, it is not).
355. See supra notes 335-338 and accompanying text (describing how concerns of excessive
discovery are a persistent dilemma rather than a new development).
356. See supra notes 335-338 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 320-352 and accompanying text (demonstrating that it is the
misperception that discovery is abused that is rampant rather than actual discovery abuse and that
concerns of excessive discovery are a recurring theme built into the Federal Rules).
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iii. A Heightened Pleading Standard Will Not Decrease Securities
Litigation Costs
Litigation, not only for securities fraud class actions, is an interactive
investment process, 358 influenced by the other party's actual or
anticipated expenditures. 3 59 The high costs of securities litigation and
settlement are not due to frivolous litigation, nuisance suits, or abusive
360
discovery practices, but rather result from this symbiotic relationship.
Despite the lower filing rate, settlement costs on average have been
rising.361 The top ten recent shareholder class action settlements
exceeded $1 billion. 362 In 2007, Enron settled a class action suit for
$7.2 billion. 36 3 Tyco International announced an agreement to pay
$2.975 billion as a settlement, making it the largest amount ever paid by
a single settling defendant. 3 64 Even excluding the Enron settlement and
other mega-settlements, one study finds that the total value of cases that
are settled continues to exceed previous averages from 1996 to 2005.365
These giant settlements seem to support the Court's concern that the
threat of exorbitant costs pressure defendants into settling claims with
little or no merit. 36 6 However, as the NERA Economic Consulting
Study indicates, these giant settlements correspond to giant investor
losses.367 In fact, NERA finds investor losses are the single most

358. Trubek et al., supra note 323, at 76-77 (discussing the idea that litigation is an
investment of scarce resources to achieve a future result); see also Higginbotham, supra note 304,
at 1412 (stating that decisions on whether to go to trial are based on cost concerns).
359. Trubek et al., supra note 323, at 77.
360. See infra notes 360-375 and accompanying text (arguing that higher settlement costs are
proportional to increasing investor losses and increasing numbers of injured plaintiffs, and that
higher litigation costs are proportional to the higher amounts in controversy).
361. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 9. The median settlement amount hit a new high in 2007
as well, increasing from an average of $7 million to $9 million. Id. at 11. NERA reported that at
the end of 2007, the median settlement value was $9.6 million. Plancich, supra note 308, at 13.
362. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 9.
363. Id. Also in 2007, McKesson HBOC Inc. settled for $1.033 billion. Id. at 8; see also
Laure E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2006 Review and
Analysis, at 1 (2006), http://www.cornerstone.com.
364. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 9.
365. Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings: 2006: A Year in Review, at
1 (2006), http://www.cornerstone.com [hereinafter Cornerstone Research, 20061; see also
Plancich, supra note 308, at 1, 9-13 (stating that average settlements have increased to reach a
peak of $33.2 million in 2007).
366. See supra notes 187, 193, 201 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's concern
that high litigation costs will pressure defendants into settlement); see also supra notes 360-365
and accompanying text (discussing statistics detailing the rising settlement costs).
367. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 9. Investor losses are defined as an estimate of what
investors lost over a class period relative to an investment in the S&P 500. Id.
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powerful predictor of settlement size. 3 68 Thus, higher settlements result
from higher losses suffered by plaintiffs, not because of an increase in
strike suits. 369 Congress did not intend to prevent injured plaintiffs
from recovering for their losses. 370 These huge settlements indicate
more damage done to investors, not more strike suits filed by
plaintiffs. 37 '

Furthermore, investor losses are actually stabilizing despite higher
settlement values. 3 72 When considered in conjunction with the median
amount of estimated damages, the percentage of the median settlement
amount 37 3 has been lower than in previous years. 374 Thus, high
settlements are proportional to the higher losses suffered by
plaintiffs.3 7 5
Another factor to consider in assessing costs in securities cases is the
overall status of the market. Market conditions strongly affect the rate
of filings. 376 The PSLRA has been shown to have no impact on the rate
of filings in months following market declines and/or market
increases. 3 77 By the same token, the average annual share volume on
the NASDAQ grew from 60.8 billion shares in the pre-PSLRA study
368. Id. NERA lists a host of other factors that may affect the amount of settlement, including
the existence of accounting violations, an announced investigation by a public body, whether the
company is an IPO, whether an institutional investor is the lead plaintiff, and whether the class
consists of members other than common stock shareholders. Id. at 12-13. NERA does not list a
heightened pleading requirement as indicative of settlement value.
369. Id. at 9.
370. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 ("Private securities litigation ... help[s] deter wrongdoing... [and] is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely
upon government action.").
371. See also supra Part IV.B. I .i (illustrating the trend of declining securities filings).
372. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 12. At the close of 2007, NERA reported the median ratio
of settlements to investor losses was 2.4%. Plancich, supra note 308, at 14.
373. Compare Median: located in or related to the precise midpoint in a range of values or
quantities, such that half of them fall above the midpoint and half below, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1002 (8th ed. 1999), with Mean: of or relating to an intermediate point between two
points or extremes. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1001 (8th ed. 1999)

374. Simmons & Ryan, supra note 363, at 6. The median settlement as a percentage of
estimated damages was only 2.4 percent in 2006. Id. at 6. However, this may be because the
Supreme Court's Dura decision in 2005 led to lower proportionate settlements. Id. at 5-6; see
also Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (holding that an investor claiming
securities fraud cannot establish economic loss by simply alleging, and later establishing, that the
price of the security on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation).
375. Plancich, supra note 308, at 14 (saying that as investor losses increase, settlements
increase, but at a lower rate); see supra notes 367-371 and accompanying text (arguing that the
average settlement value of securities class actions is rising because the average losses suffered
by investor-plaintiffs is larger).
376. Perino, supra note 56, at 934.
377. Id. at 934-35.
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period to 281.7 billion shares after the passage of the PSLRA.3 7 8
Simply put, there is more money at stake in securities class actions now
than there was prior to the enactment of the PSLRA because there is
more money in the market now than there was before.3 79 Also, the
greater the number of shares traded during a class period at a particular
affected price, the more plaintiffs affected, and, in turn, the more
380
damages claimed.
Moreover, securities claims deal with higher dollar amounts than
typical lawsuits, 38 1 further accounting for the existence of higher
discovery and litigation costs. For example, one study indicates that the
3 82
volume of discovery is directly related to the amount in controversy.
Therefore, it is only logical that in securities claims, with millions (and
sometimes even billions) of dollars at stake,38 3 the volume of discovery
will be higher than in normal litigation. 3 84 Thus, similar to the
relationship between investor losses and settlements, discovery costs are
not exorbitant, but are instead proportional to the massive size of
3 85
securities claims.
The concerns of the Supreme Court and Congress about increased
discovery and settlement costs for in terrorem settlements are not
groundless, however. 386 One of the reasons why Congress enacted the
PSLRA was to reduce in terrorem settlements whereby defendants
3 87
settle based on the fear of extraordinary discovery or litigation costs.
There is a risk that some meritless cases will be settled because a large

378. Id. at 938.
379. Id. at 939.
380. Id.
381. Compare Foster et al., supra note 13, at 8 (listing top ten shareholder class actions in
securities as all exceeding $1 billion) with Trubek et al., supra note 323, at 92 (detailing findings

of allocation of legal fees in ordinary litigation scenarios).
382. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 793.
383. See Foster et al., supra note 13, at 8 (listing top ten shareholder class actions in securities
as all exceeding $1 billion).
384. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 797.
385. See supra notes 381-384 and accompanying text (arguing that discovery costs in
securities litigation are perceived as high because the amount at stake in an average securities
class action is typically higher than an average lawsuit).
386. See infra notes 387-388 and accompanying text (discussing how defendants may feel
pressure in some instances to settle cases without merit).
387. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688; H.R. REP.
No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
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corporate defendant believes it is cheaper38 8to settle, wants to avoid

reputational losses, or is simply risk averse.
Yet raising the bar on pleading requirements too high will invariably
undercut the aim of reducing expected litigation and settlement costs,
because plaintiffs are likely to compensate by bringing higher stakes
390

suits. 389 To begin, the PSLRA has resulted in litigation delays.

Settlements are becoming more costly since the enactment of the
PSLRA, not because of strike suits, but rather because the PSLRA has

made litigation for plaintiffs more costly; thus plaintiffs only bring
cases that are likely to have larger damages overall. 39 1 In fact, data
collected from the first half of 2007 shows that, while the rate of
securities class action filings are down, the amount of claimed losses
suffered has actually risen since 2006.392 If this trend continues, one
can see the danger in raising the pleading standard: by raising pleading
requirements, litigation risks increase and plaintiffs cover this additional

388. See Perino, supra note 56, at 921 (discussing reasons why a large corporate defendant
might settle lawsuits filed immediately after a significant decline in stock price). The fact that
defendants are sometimes pressured into settlement rather than risk adverse disclosures is a
criticism common to the entire discovery system, not just securities claims. See McKenna &
Wiggins, supra note 318, at 792-93 (pointing out that discovery itself is commonly criticized as
leading to unjust results because of increased information availability).
389. See infra notes 390-395 and accompanying text (demonstrating how a higher pleading
standard may create a cyclical problem rather than a solution to increasing litigation costs).
390. Milstein, supra note 48, at 1254 ("[The] PSLRA has created endless hurdles for injured
plaintiffs and their attorneys and delayed outcomes of the litigation."); see also Perino, supra note
56, at 970 (concluding that a higher gate-keeping function may increase costs because of resulting
increased usage of pretrial motions).
391. See Perino, supra note 56, at 957 (stating that because of the increased risk in suing
under the PSLRA, plaintiffs are bringing suits with larger potential damages); see also
Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that the filing of "mega" filings has risen and
that other provisions of the PSLRA, like the Act's lead plaintiff provision, may create rising costs
in suit and settlement); Simmons & Ryan, supra note 363, at 10 (noting that the presence of an
institutional investor is associated with a statistically significant increase in settlement size).
392. Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 7. One study concludes that over the last
decade, average investor losses have increased dramatically. Plancich, supra note 308, at 14. At
the end of 2007, NERA reported that median investor losses for cases settled in 2007 were $3 10
million and the median investor losses for cases filed were $355 million, the highest in the threeyear period. Id. at 15. This is a signal that the settlements associated with these new filings
might remain high. Id.
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risk by bringing cases with greater alleged damages. 39 3 Thus, by raising
the pleading standard,3 94 one might see the overall damages involved in
a claim actually rise, 39 5 subverting the intent to decrease costs to
corporate defendants and the market overall.
For example, consider the following concept: (1) Congress enacted
the PSLRA and its strong inference requirement in response to
perceived abuses of discovery in securities litigation; 396 (2) plaintiffs
compensate for the higher risk of litigation, i.e., increased risk of
dismissal as a result of the higher pleading standard, by bringing cases
with larger damages; 39 7 (3) thus, the cost of litigation, including
discovery, as it is proportional to the size of the claim, rises; 398 (4) then,
these higher litigation costs are misperceived as abuses. 39 9 Thus, the
Court should be particularly wary of applying any heightened standard

393. See Perino, supra note 56, at 941 ("[l]f case values increase enough, then attorneys will
still have incentives to undertake the risk of litigation under the PSLRA."). This is further
evidenced by a 2006 study finding the rate of filings was lower but settlement amounts are
increasing. Cornerstone Research, 2006, supra note 365, at 1. Thus, plaintiffs are bringing fewer
claims, but the ones they are bringing are commanding a much higher price. However, Perino
also argues that plaintiffs may be able to bring more suits with smaller capital investments
because of the stay of discovery provision. Perino, supra note 56, at 936. Nevertheless, this
argument rests on the fact that such a strategy would make sense only if more actions were
brought for smaller claims. Id. Therefore, this argument must fail as more recent data has shown
filings are decreasing and claim amounts are increasing. See supra Part IV.B.l.iii (demonstrating
how securities class actions are being filed less and less frequently, but settlement amounts are at
all-time highs). In sum, it is reasonable to conclude the stay of discovery provision is not making
it cheaper for plaintiffs to bring suit.
394. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Rights & Issues, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-10 (2007)
(requiring courts to find an inference of scienter at least as likely as nonculpable inferences at the
pleading stage).
395. Choi, supra note 54, at 604.
396. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 736 (justifying the PSLRA which imposes a heightened pleading standard because of
perceived abuses in securities fraud litigation); see also Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509 (justifying a
heightened pleading standard because of the threat of discovery abuses).
397. See Choi, supra note 54, at 606-09 (describing statistics whereby plaintiffs compensate
for the higher risks of litigation by bringing suits with higher damages); Perino, supra note 56, at
941 (stating that large settlements and fee awards since the enactment of the PSLRA indicate
continued incentive for attorneys to file securities class actions).
398. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 318, at 793 (noting that the costs of litigation are
proportional to the size of the claim); see also supra notes 381-385 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that high discovery costs in securities fraud class actions are proportional to the
higher than average amount in controversy).
399. See Bruggman, supra note 318, at 12 (arguing that data indicates discovery abuse is not
as widespread as the actual misperception of it is); see also supra notes 325-330 and
accompanying text (describing data indicating that in actuality, relatively little discovery occurs
in the course of an ordinary lawsuit).
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as exacting pleading requirements may actually raise the securities
40 0
litigation costs it seeks to prevent.
In addition, empirical evidence does not indicate that a tougher
pleading standard is even necessary to reduce the rate of frivolous
filings. 40 1 The PSLRA's heightened pleading standard is not among the
40 2
reasons posited to explain the continual decline in securities filings.
Data tracking the number of securities filings among the circuits finds
that in 2006, before Tellabs, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
had among the highest rates of securities class action filings. 40 3 Thus,
despite the fact that the Second Circuit's interpretation of "strong
inference" is drastically different than the arguably more stringent
standard of the Ninth Circuit, filings in both Circuits remained high.40 4
The Ninth Circuit, which has adopted arguably the harshest standard,4 °5
was dominated in 2006 by four filings which contributed to a maximum
dollar loss of $98 billion. 40 6 The inference to be drawn from this data is
that pleading standards have little direct effect on a plaintiffs' attorney's
40 7
ability to file a claim.

400. See supra notes 390-395 and accompanying text (illustrating how a heightened pleading
standard in response to perceived abuse leads plaintiff attorneys to compensate for the increased
risk of dismissal by bringing claims with larger damages; as a result, the cost of litigation as a
whole rises and is itself misperceived as an abuse of the system).
401. Brief of Council of Institutional Investors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
6, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484).
402. Cornerstone Research, supra note 13, at 3 (offering two hypotheses why securities fraud
filings are down, including (1) that there is simply less fraud due to aggressive enforcement and
oversight by the SEC and (2) the strong stock market containing low volatility is tied with class
action filings); see also, Simmons & Ryan, supra note 363, at 18 (listing important determinants
of settlement amounts such as assets of the defendant firm, whether an accountant is named codefendant, and even whether the claim was filed in the Second Circuit; but not listing anything
concerning a pleading standard).
403. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 3.
404. Cornerstone Research, 2006, supra note 365, at 15. The Second Circuit had thirty-one
filings in 2006 and the Ninth Circuit had twenty-five filings in 2006. Id. Historically, the Ninth
and Second Circuits have had the highest number of class action filings. See id. at Exhibit 12
(charting class action filings by circuit since 1996). But see Perino, supra note 56, at 945
(suggesting that a decrease in the overall percentage of defendants sued in the Ninth Circuit is a
result of the stringent pleading standard). Also, Perino's findings indicate that a less stringent
standard does not result in a significant increase in litigation. Id. at 946.
405. See Perino, supra note 56, at 926 (characterizing the Ninth Circuit's standard as "the
most rigorous version of the pleading standard").
406. Cornerstone Research, 2006, supra note 365, at 16.
407. See Andrew Longstreth, Starving for (Class) Action, AM. LAW., Aug. 1, 2007, at 13
(discussing defense lawyers' reaction to the statistical drop in filings and noting the feigned
indifference of a partner at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker who expressed abiding faith in the
creativity of the plaintiff's bar to overcome legal obstacles).
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In short, there is an interesting dynamic at work in securities class
action litigation: filings overall are declining while settlements are
rising. 40 8 These mega settlements are misperceived as the byproduct of
abusive and excessive litigation. 40 9 However, the data rather shows that
plaintiffs are suffering increasingly greater losses. 4 10 Settlement sizes
in relation to plaintiff's losses are actually stabilizing and appear to be
declining. 4 11 These higher settlements and costs are more rationally
explained by the general increase of value and volume in the market as
well. 4 12 The Court's standard should have acknowledged this dynamic
so that roundabout misperceptions of costs do not further damage
plaintiffs' ability to bring merited suits. 4 13 Unfortunately the Court
failed to acknowledge this phenomenon, instead falling into the
has run roughshod over the
seductive misperception that discovery 4 14
system victimizing corporate defendants.

408. See supra Part IV.B.I.i (discussing the statistical drop in securities fraud class action
filings and the statistical drop in the rate of corporate securities issuers likely subject to suit).
409. See supra Part IV.B.l.ii (demonstrating how discovery is misperceived as an abused
procedural tool, but that actual data has not quantified it as such).
410. See supra Part IV.B.l.iii (arguing the rise in average settlement amount results from a
corresponding rise in investor losses, rather than from a rise in nuisance filings).
411. See supra notes 372-375 and accompanying text (showing how the median settlement
amount is leveling off).
412. See supra notes 376-380 (discussing how the general increase in value of the financial
markets and in the number of investors in these markets creates a larger plaintiff pool and higher
damages).
413. See Bruggman, supra note 318, at 12 (discussing how the theory of discovery as abused
is based on misperceptions rather than hard data and evidence).
414. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Rights & Issues, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2007)
(discussing how the risk of abusive discovery may pressure defendants into settlement).
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4 15
2. Other PSLRA Provisions Address Discovery Concerns

The Court could have appropriately addressed concerns of abusive
discovery practices by issuing an opinion advocating better use of the
PSLRA's stay of discovery and FRCP Rule 11 provisions. 4 16 The 1933
Act and the 1934 Act were both aimed at protecting investors against
fraud.4 17 These acts and the PSLRA, considered together, take a
4 18
holistic approach to protecting the integrity of our financial markets.
Thus, the acts should be interpreted holistically. 4 19 The Court should
415. If the court is so concerned with excessive discovery, more appropriate remedies are
other pretrial procedures already in place, such as motions for a more definite statement, FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(e), court sanctions for abusive discovery tactics, FED. R. Civ. P. 11, taking judicial
notice of certain facts, FED. R. EvID. 201, and strict enforcement of automatic disclosure
provisions. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. There is no reason to infer these traditional pretrial motions are
not available in securities fraud class actions. The Court's new rule ignores other pretrial
procedures that may be more appropriate to deal with concerns raised by the Court. See
McArdle, supra note 270, at 46 (saying that frivolous, groundless, or fraudulent claims can be
dealt with through pretrial procedures like motions for summary judgment); see also Michael J.
Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation Under the FederalSecurities
Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1, 22 (2005) (noting that the Private Securities Litigation Act invites
defendants to test the merit of pleadings through motions to dismiss and by asking the court to
stay discovery). Indeed, concerns of excessive discovery have been addressed before by Justice
Thomas in Swierkiewicz:
If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice,
a defendant can move for a more definite statement under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) before
responding. Moreover, claims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary
judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The liberal notice pleading of FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)
is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus
litigation on the merits of a claim.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). Previously, Justice Black addressed
these concerns in Conley as well. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(e) (motion for a more definite statement); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (motion to strike); FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (pre-trial procedure
and formulation of issue); FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (depositions and discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 56
(motion for summary judgment); and FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (right to amend)), abrogated by Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Likewise, Justice Stevens said the Court's
concern with costly discovery "is no reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater" and that
such concerns are appropriately addressed with procedural remedies already in place. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. at 1988 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
416. See infra Part IV.B.2.i (describing the PSLRA's stay of discovery provision and
enhanced Rule 11 sanctions).
417. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382 (1976) (noting that the 1933 Act "was
designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public
offerings . . . and to protect them against fraud" while "the 1934 Act was intended principally to
protect investors").
418. Id. at 1387 ("[T]he interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws is
certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has chosen.") (quoting
SEC v. Nat'l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969)).
419. See id. at 1388-89 (refusing to adopt an interpretation of §10(b) applying a negligence
standard for accountants alleged to have violated § 10(b) that would seem to subvert procedural
restrictions applicable under § 11 and § 12(2)).
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strive to achieve harmony among the securities laws. 42 0 In so doing, the
Court should not single out the heightened pleading standard as the sole
42 1
device to effectuate legislative aims or to curb excessive discovery.
As this Part explores, there are primarily two provisions in the PSLRA,
the stay of discovery and the Rule 11 provisions, which are more apt to
deal with legislative concerns than the pleading standard.4 2 2
4 23
i. The PSLRA's Stay of Discovery Provision

Congress passed the PSLRA in response to concerns over excessive
discovery costs and fishing expeditions by plaintiffs in securities
claims. 4 24 Congress' answer to these concerns was to enact a stay of
discovery provision in the PSLRA.4 25 This provision provides that

420. Id.
421. The Court does acknowledge these other provisions of the PSLRA, but does nothing
more. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Rights & Issues, Ltd. 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2007). In essence, the
PSLRA's strong inference provision was aimed at unifying the pleading standard. See id. at
2507-08 (discussing the circuit split on the application of Rule 9(b) to securities cases). Even
Senators more concerned with the abusive nature of securities litigation and advocating
strengthened standards recommended more stringent liability provisions, tougher sanctions for
abusive practices, strengthening safe harbor provisions, and delineating a clearer standard for
liability, but not for a stricter pleading standard. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 33-35 (1995), as
reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 711-13. Particularly, the heightened pleading standard was
not designed to keep claims out of court, but it was aimed at giving full effect to concerns which
9(b) was originally designed to address, such as protecting defendant's reputations from hostile
claims of fraud. Congress said:
Naming a party in a civil suit for fraud is a serious matter. Unwarranted fraud claims
can lead to serious injury to reputation for which our legal system effectively offers no
redress. For this reason, among others, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that plaintiffs plead allegations of fraud with "particularity." The
Rule has not prevented abuse of the securities laws by private litigants .... The House
and Senate hearings on securities litigation reform included testimony on the need to
establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing of
meritless lawsuits.
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
422. See generally BERSHAD ET AL, supra note 7, at 31-51 (discussing proposals for securities
fraud litigation reform).
423. See generally Milstein, supra note 48, at 1288-94 (describing the PSLRA's overall
impact on the discovery process).
424. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693; H.R.
REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736
(discussing testimony from general counsel of an investment bank that discovery costs account
for roughly 80% of total securities litigation costs).
425. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. However, the perception of discovery abuse is present in
ordinary litigation as well and, likewise, judges are loathe to enforce or impose sanctions for
violating discovery rules. Bruggman, supra note 318, at 2.
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courts must stay discovery pending a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.4 26
Discovery is put on hold unless there is a particularized showing that
absent discovery, a party will suffer undue prejudice. 4 27 The provision
stays even mandatory disclosures. 42 8 Thus, discovery does not
429
commence until after a court rules on a 12(b)(6) motion.

ii. The PSLRA's Enhanced Rule 11 Sanctions Provision
To address the concern that lawyers may file factually baseless
claims and subsequently use discovery as a fishing expedition to find a
sustainable claim, 430 Congress also enacted a provision related to

FRCP 11.431 This provision requires courts to issue findings that the
attorneys and parties have complied with Rule I l's requirement that
there be no improper purpose for pleadings and that the allegations
contain existing evidentiary support. 43 2 The goal of reducing meritless
suits without hindering the ability of victims of fraud to pursue
legitimate claims could be dealt with by strengthening the application of
4 33
Rule 11.
434
However, this provision is not currently utilized to its full capacity.
A 2002 study suggests that procedural barriers do not affect the filing of
nonmeritorious suits.4 35 To actually effectuate change, courts should
not only engage in a sanctions review but also impose sanctions or fee

426. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). However, there is an exception if a court finds upon motion
of any party that a particularized discovery request is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to that party. See 26 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Limits on Abusive Discovery, in
SECURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES § 3:8 n.6 (2007) ("An example of a situation involving the
necessity to preserve evidence may be terminal illness of an important witness.").
427. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(C). Courts recognize an additional exception to the stay of
discovery when there is a risk that evidence will be destroyed if discovery does not commence.
Med. Imaging Ctr. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 720 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (stating
two exceptions: (1) to preserve the evidence and (2) to prevent undue prejudice); see also Perino,
supra note 56, at 929 (noting that Congress likely anticipated the discovery stay would slow the
race to the courthouse door as plaintiffs would be forced to do more extensive prefiling
investigations).
428. Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996).
429. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000).
430. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693.
431. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(l)-(2) (sanctions for abusive litigation).
432. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686.
433. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 738.
434. Perino, supra note 56, at 938 (finding that small sanctions are imposed in only a handful
of cases).
435. Id.
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shifting if the action is dismissed.4 3 6 Plaintiffs' attorneys would thus
43 7
have less of an economic incentive to initiate strike suits.
Consequently, Rule 11 can work to impose direct costs on attorneys
4 38
themselves.
3. The Court Failed to Balance Concerns of Frivolous Litigation with
the Need to Preserve Meritorious Claims
Had the Court in Tellabs focused to a greater extent on other PSLRA
provisions and the actual rate of filing of securities fraud actions, it may
have been able to strike the desired balance. 43 9 In enacting the PSLRA,
Congress was addressing the concern that defendants were being forced
into settlements. 440 However, the PSLRA is not aimed at furthering
only the agendas of corporate defendants. 44 1 The statute aims to strike
an optimal balance between protecting investors by preserving
meritorious suits and protecting corporate defendants from frivolous
claims, which thereby promotes strong financial markets. 44 2 In Tellabs,
the Court neglected part of this balance: protecting investors'
meritorious suits. 44 3 The PSLRA should be a tool to deter wrongdoing,
not to facilitate corporate fraud.44 4 When discussing the possibility of

436. Id. at 971. Perino also argues Congress should alter current damage calculation methods
and attorney fee models. Id. at 973-74.
437. Id. at 971.
438. Id.
439. See infra notes 440-446 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the PSLRA has
already resulted in the dismissal of meritorious claims and that now, the Tellabs rule, which
further heightens the standard, will result in the dismissal of more meritorious securities fraud
claims, thus subverting the true intention of the PSLRA: to protect meritorious claims as well as
prevent nuisance filings).
440. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
441. Id.
442. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 1 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). But see Mulreed, supra note 71, at
792-805 (arguing that the core provisions of the PSLRA are hostile toward the plaintiff and
greatly disadvantage him in litigation); see also Miest, supra note 12, at 1132-34 (arguing that
the Securities Acts are aimed at full and fair disclosure). The Court should be particularly careful
when dealing with the balance involved with procedural rules because procedural rules allocate
power between litigants and thus affect substantive rights. Moskowitz, supra note at 324, at 596.
443. See infra notes 447-451 and accompanying text (arguing that the PSLRA, which
imposes a heightened pleading standard, negatively impacted a plaintiff's ability to survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; and that the Tellabs decision, which imposes a more heightened
pleading standard, will further impact a plaintiff's ability to survive a 12(b)(6) motion).
444. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730 ("Private securities litigation . . . help[s] to deter wrongdoing . . . [and] is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely
upon government action.").
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strike suits, it is easy to list a parade of horribles. 44 5 However, the risk
posed by a standard resulting
in the dismissal of meritorious suits is
44 6
likewise paramount.
The PSLRA had already affected the dismissal rates of securities
fraud claims, even prior to the Tellabs decision. 44 7 Before the PSLRA
was adopted, dismissals accounted for only 19.4% of dispositions of
securities class actions. 44 8 After the statute, dismissals have accounted
for 39.1% of dispositions. 44 9 Even in the past year, dismissal rates have
increased. 4 50 Because Tellabs further heightens the pleading standard
451
for plaintiffs, it may further increase dismissal rates.
Even if a heightened pleading standard produces a pool of less
frivolous claims at the pleading stage, a key portion of the inquiry is
missing: are nonnuisance suits also less prevalent; are meritorious
claims going by the wayside? 4 52 Some legal practitioners argue that the
decision took an evenhanded approach, balancing the need to curb
frivolous litigation as well as permitting meritorious claims to

445. See Miest, supra note 12, at 1133-34 (listing various effects threats of "strike suits"
have on "targeted" corporations, including the costs and time spent defending lawsuits and
millions of dollars spent on settlement, which may not be proportionate to the merits of the suit).
446. KAUFMAN, supra note 35 ("As the legislative juggernaut rolled on there were critics of
the product... By inhibiting the rights of individuals to seek damages, we lowered the risks for
securities fraud, eliminated deterrence, and fostered a culture of laxity.").
447. See Daniela Nanau, Analyzing Post-Market Boom Jurisprudence in the Second and Ninth
Circuits: Has the Pendulum Really Swung too Far in Favor of Plaintiffs?, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHIcs J. 943, 974 (2006) (concluding that the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard
has severely limited a plaintiff s ability to survive at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Foster
et al., supra note 13, at 7 (noting that dismissal rates have increased substantially since the
passage of the PSLRA); Perino, supra note 56, at 937 (quoting studies finding an increase in
securities fraud action dismissal rates).
448. Foster et al., supra note 13, at 7.
449. Id.
450. Id. The dismissal rates for 2004-2006 were 38.2%. Id. From 2005 to 2007, the
dismissal rate was 39.1%. Id. According to NERA, a possibility for some of this decline may be
the Supreme Court's Dura decision in 2005. Id. Dura held that investors could no longer allege
loss causation by merely alleging a price drop after a disclosure of a misrepresentation. Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
451. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-10 (2007); see supra
notes 446-451 (arguing that since the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard adversely impacted
plaintiffs, so too will the Tellabs decision as it likewise imposes a heightened pleading standard).
452. Choi, supra note 54, at 603.
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proceed.4 5 3 However, data indicates that meritorious suits are actually
being dismissed.45 4 A pleading standard that casts a wide net at the
expense of meritorious claims fails to achieve the desired balance of the
4 55
statute and denies injured investors a remedy.
Data from 2007 demonstrates that nonnuisance claims face a higher
risk of dismissal and a lower probability of suit since the enactment of
the PSLRA. 45 6 Specifically, nonnuisance claims, claims which lack
pre-filing hard evidence of fraud 45 7 and where the amount involved is
typically only between $2 million and $4 million, are less likely to be
filed, and, even if filed, still less likely to succeed.4 5 8 Securities issuers
that faced meritorious suits without pre-filing hard evidence in the prePSLRA period are much less likely to face such a lawsuit in the postPSLRA period. 4 59 That is, since the PSLRA, corporate defendants that
would have been sued are not being sued. 460 Similarly, there is a
general decline in plaintiffs' attorneys even pursuing nonnuisance1
46
litigation absent pre-filing hard evidence in the post-PSLRA period.
Since the adoption of the PSLRA, companies engaging in fraud where
there is no hard evidence to prove it are significantly less likely to face a

453. See Lattman, supra note 255 (quoting Stan Bernstein, of Bernstein Leibhard, as saying,
"By rejecting the extreme positions advocated by defendants and their amici that would have
required plaintiffs to essentially prove their entire case at the pleading stage, the Court struck a
reasonable balance between preserving investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims and
curbing frivolous litigation."); see also Thomas 0. Gorman, Tellabs: The Supreme Court Strikes
a Balance Regarding Requirements in Securities Damage Actions, June 21, 2007,
http://www.secactions.com/?p=202 (saying that the decision is not a clear victory for either side
and represents a balance between competing interests); Kevin M. LaCroix, The Supreme Court
Issues Tellabs Opinion, June 22, 2007, http://dandodiary.com2007/06/articles/securitieslitigation/supreme-court-issues-tellabs-opinion/ (characterizing the decision as a "draw at best").
454. See infra notes 456-464 and accompanying text (demonstrating the recent rise in
dismissals of securities fraud claims previously judged to be with merit).
455. See infra notes 456-464 and accompanying text (illustrating how meritorious claims are
being dismissed). It is important to note that it is wholly agreed that strike suits are in no way
beneficial to defendants or investors. See Mulreed, supra note 71, at 791 (noting that strike suits
resulting in large settlements are inefficient allocations of corporate assets).
456. Choi, supra note 54, at 598.
457. Pre-filing hard evidence is defined as either an allegation of an accounting restatement of
revenue or earnings or a SEC action. Id. at 601.
458. Id. at 623.
459. Id. at 601.
460. Id. at 615. Choi found that the incidence of nonnuisance suits filed pre-PSLRA is 3.5%.
Id. However, those same suits, Choi predicts, would only have been filed at a rate of 1.7% in the
post-PSLRA period. Id. Thus, the difference, Choi concludes, is significant. Id. Choi also notes
that the difference in means of incidences of suit is not statistically significant. Id.
461. Id. at617.
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private securities class action. 462 Plaintiffs' attorneys are shifting their
attention to fraud cases where there is better evidence, in order to meet
the pleading standard under the PSLRA (and now under Tellabs),
without information gained during discovery. 4 63 This pursuit will
ultimately lead to plaintiffs' attorneys seeking (and possibly recovering)
4 64
a larger amount of damages to offset increased risks.
C. The Constitutionalityof Weighing Inferences at the Pleading
Stage

46 5

Along with the Court's desire to curb excessive discovery in
securities litigation, the Court also sought to assuage concerns about the
pleading standard's impact on the Seventh Amendment. 466 The
Seventh Amendment has been a jealously guarded right of the
American people since our nation's inception. 4 67 It provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the
4 68
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

462. Id. at 622. See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the
PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 648-50 (2007) (finding the
PSLRA increased the incidence of hard-evidence cases of fraud, but not examining the impact of
the PSLRA on other potentially meritorious claims).
463. Choi, supra note 54, at 622.
464. Id. at 622-23; see also supra Part IV.B.1.iii (illustrating how a heightened pleading
standard may inadvertently increase litigation costs).
465. See Thomas, supra note 334 (discussing the constitutional infirmity of the PSLRA as it
relates to the Seventh Amendment); Suja. A. Thomas, Why a Motion to Dismiss is Now
Unconstitutional(UNIV. OF CINCINNATI PUB. LAW, Working Paper No. 07-15, 2007), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=1010062 (arguing that the Tellabs and Twombly decisions now make a
motion to dismiss unconstitutional) [hereinafter Thomas, Motion to Dismiss]. See generally RITA
J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 11-25 (1980) (concluding that juries are
generally depicted negatively in the media).
466. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2511-12 (2007).
467. See generally LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY
(Anderson Publishing Co. 1988) (1973) (tracing the development of the Seventh Amendment);
see also, JOHN GUNTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA xiii (1988) (commenting on the absolute
absurdity of having twelve strangers forced to sit and listen to a case in which they have no
personal interest and then render an effectual decision, but acknowledging that the juries are
nonetheless the conscience of our community). But see ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE
CIVIL JURY 12 (2001) (noting the statistical drop in cases ending in jury trials since 1938 when
the Federal Rules were enacted).
468. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Originally, the proposed Constitution contained no right for a
jury trial in civil cases, only criminal cases. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 3 ("[T]he Trial of all
crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury... "); Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh
Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 582 (2003). The
Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791. Id. at 581.
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The Amendment's language invokes the historical distinction
between the common law and equity, and between law and fact. 4 69 The
jury is seen as the "last element of republicanism designed to offset the
monarchial tendencies of the federal judiciary."470 Over time, the jury
trial has had its share of redundant criticisms 4 7 1 and textbook
defenses. 472 Despite this ongoing debate, some vestige of the jury trial
right still remains in effect. 47 3 Nevertheless, the right to a jury trial is
not absolute. 4 74 Current Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the
Seventh Amendment requires only the preservation of the substance of
469. Sward, supra note 468, at 583. The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh
Amendment does not prohibit Congress from providing for only an administrative determination
of newly created statutory rights. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977).
However, a statute governing private rights historically triable by a jury still falls under Seventh
Amendment protection. Curtis v. Loether. 415 US. 189, 193-94 (1974). See generally
RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1986) (detailing the scope of the
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury).
470. Originally, the right to a jury trial was seen as so fundamental that the absence of it
helped spur the American Revolution. GUNTHER, supra note 467, at 30 (noting that after
Parliament passed the Stamp Act of 1764, it proved difficult to enforce because colonial juries
were reluctant to enforce British laws, and thus to enforce it, Parliament moved prosecutions from
the Common Pleas to the admiralty courts where juries were not allowed); see also SWARD, supra
note 467, at 90-91 (describing England's process of moving controversial cases favorable to the
crown out of the hands of American jurors during the colonial period). Eventually, the First
Continental Congress would assert this qualm against England in the Declaration of
Independence. GUNTHER, supra note 467, at 31.
471. See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 33, 39-41 (1990) (arguing that jury trials preclude evidence from entering trial
to protect lay jurors, force a trial into a compact event, impose unfettered moral judgment in tort
law that is ultimately detrimental to victims, and turns lawyers into flamboyant actors).
472. See SWARD, supra note 467, at 23-65 (noting that the jury generally serves four
functions: (1)a dispute settling role, in which it serves as an equalizer among citizens leveling
inappropriate influence; (2) a law-making role, through jury nullification and achieving an
indirect regulatory effect; (3) a political role, as it protects the individual against the tyranny of
the government; and (4) a socializing role, in that in encourages diverse involvement); see also
Carrington, supra note 471, at 37-39 (listing similar jury roles).
473. With the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the law and equity
distinction was merged into a single set of procedures. Sward, supra note 468, at 589.
Specifically, Rule 38(a) preserves the right to trial by jury, although it is limited by requiring
parties to demand a jury trial in advance. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) ("The right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution-or as provided by a federal statute-is
preserved to the parties inviolate."). The enactment of the Federal Rules has been characterized
as a hostile act committed against the jury trial right by creating a presumption in favor of a bench
trial. SWARD, supra note 467, at 108-09.
474. The Seventh Amendment does not create a right, but rather preserves the right to a trial
by jury as it existed under the common law in 1791. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 146 (2007). Traditionally, equity matters were not
resolved by a jury trial, but legal matters were. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433 (1830). For a
general background of the law and equity distinction see LYNN, supra note 469, at 10-12; see
also Chevron v. Oubre, 93 F.R.D. 622, 623 (M.D. La. 1982) (holding that an action to cancel
mineral lease is equitable and not subject to trial by jury).
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the English common law jury trial as it existed in 1791. 4 75

In the

English common law, juries decided only questions of fact and not
questions of law. 4 76 Thus, questions of fact are reserved for the jury,
477
and the court should not assume that function, directly or indirectly.
In Tellabs, the Court dispenses with Seventh Amendment concerns
raised by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 478 Recall that the Court in
Tellabs held that weighing competing inferences, while constantly
assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, does not infringe on the
Seventh Amendment. 4 79 Notwithstanding the Court's assurances, this
weighing of inferences on a motion to dismiss does infringe on the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because judges usurp the jury's

facts in a manner inconsistent with common
function of determining
80
4

law procedures.
Furthermore, there are three aspects of a 12(b)(6) motion which tend
to complicate Seventh Amendment implications. 481 First, a 12(b)(6)
motion is a procedural mechanism regulating pleadings; thus, there is4 82a
tendency to view it as immune from Seventh Amendment challenges.
475. Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure,and the English Common
Law, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 687, 700 (2004).
476. Thomas, supra note 474, at 158.
477. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) ("[U]ltimate determination of issues of fact by
the jury [should] not [be] interfered with."); Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897)
(stating that issues of fact in common law actions are to be settled by the jury).
478. See Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2511-12 (2007) ("A
court's comparative assessment of plausible inferences, while constantly assuming the plaintiff's
allegations to be true, we think it plain, does not impinge upon the Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial."); see also Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 30 (Roberts, J.) (stating
that congressional articulation of a standard to be applied as a matter of law does not interfere
with the Seventh Amendment).
479. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2511-12. The Court also said that Congress unquestionably has the
power to shape litigation through pleading requirements. Id. Such absolutist language is
dangerous because if the judge can make factual determinations or weigh competing inferences
on a motion to dismiss, pleading motions may serve as an avenue for evading and eroding
Seventh Amendment protections. Brief for Respondent (No. 06-484), supra note 58, at 45.
480. See infra notes 487-496 and accompanying text (discussing how the Tellabs rule, which
requires a resolution of a mixed question of fact and law and a resolution of the reasonableness of
inferences on a dispositive motion infringes on the right to a jury trial).
481. Allan Horwich & Sean Siekkinen, Pleading Reform or UnconstitutionalEncroachment?
An Analysis of the Seventh Amendment Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 35 SEC. REG. L. J. 4, 7 (spring 2007), availableat http://schiffhardin.com/binary/
horwich.spring07.pdf (Spring 2007).
482. Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. at 596 ("The Seventh Amendment ... does not attempt
to regulate matters of pleading or practice..."); Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 7. In
fact, the Court says just that. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512 ("No decision of this Court questions
that authority in general, or suggests, in particular, that the Seventh Amendment inhibits Congress
from establishing whatever pleading requirements it finds appropriate for federal statutory
claims.").
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Second, the Court has never addressed Seventh Amendment
implications in the context of a motion to dismiss. 4 83 Third, historically
no factual determinations were to be made at the pleading stage because
all factual allegations were presumed true. 4 84 Nevertheless, the Court's
standard infringes on the Seventh Amendment for two reasons: first, it
assumes the jury's role of determining facts, 4 85 and second, it is
4 86
inconsistent with common law procedures.
First, in support of its heightened pleading standard, the Court cites
several cases affirming the constitutionality of summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law. 4 87 However, summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law bypass the jury in a constitutionally
permissible manner because their implementation is strictly predicated
on the absence of any disputed questions in the jury's domain. 4 88 The

court may review the reasonablenessof an inference drawn by a jury,
4 89

but the court does not select from among conflicting inferences.
Here, since the Court requires judges to weigh and resolve rationally

483. Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 7. This point was also raised at oral argument.
Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 5.
484. Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 7; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45
(1957) (a plaintiffs complaint should prevail unless there are "no set of facts" entitling him to
relief). But see Kaufman, supra note 268 (arguing that Twombly abrogates Conley and restricts
irrational economic inferences from being drawn in the plaintiff's favor without an allegation of
grounds which makes the claim plausible).
485. Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 9-10 (arguing that balancing all competing
reasonable inferences at the pleading stage, as opposed to assessing the reasonableness of
inferences, violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial); see also Tellabs, Tr. of Oral
Argument, supra note 133, at 33 (Miller, Resp.'s Atty.) (noting that procedural devices are proper
as long as they do not call for a resolution of fact issues).
486. See supra notes 465-479 and accompanying text (arguing that the common law
procedures reserve all questions of fact for the jury, including questions regarding the
reasonableness of inferences, and that the Tellabs rule is at odds with traditional common law
procedure).
487. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2512 n.8 (2007) (citing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)) (allowing expert
testimony to be excluded based on a judicial determination of reliability); Neely v. Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 321 (1967) (holding a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
constitutional); Pease v. Rathburn-Jones Engineering Co., 243 U.S. 273, 278 (1917) (holding
summary judgment constitutional)).
488. Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 5.
489. Brief for Respondent (No. 06-484), supra note 58, at 48-49 (quoting Tennant v. Peoria &
Pekin Union Railway Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)). This rationale is precisely what makes
summary judgment motions constitutional. But see Thomas, supra note 474, at 159 (arguing
summary judgment is unconstitutional); see also Sward, supra note 468, at 638 (noting that the
reasonable jury standard was not announced in England until 1853, after the date of the enactment
of the Seventh Amendment).
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competing inferences, a role that properly belongs to the jury,49 0 the
Court is applying the statute in a constitutionally impermissible
1
manner.

49

After Tellabs, a Court must weigh these inferences and must make a
determination between them. 4 92 One may argue that the Court's
weighing does not ultimately resolve factual issues because the Court
requires the plaintiffs claim to be only as likely as competing
inferences. However, it is the weighing itself that is inappropriate; it is
4 93
the proper role of the jury to select among competing inferences.
Furthermore, scienter is traditionally considered a mixed question of
fact and law-not solely a question of law-which is determined by
inferences drawn from the allegations. 494 Questions of fact require
inductive inferences about transactions or occurrences. 495 When the
Court determines scienter at the pleading stage, it reaches a dispositive
conclusion about a mixed question of fact and law, which invades the
province of the jury, thereby jeopardizing the Seventh Amendment right
4 96
to a jury trial.
490. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504 ("[A] court ... must engage in a comparative evaluation; it
must consider not only inferences urged by the plaintiff . . . but also competing inference
rationally drawn from the facts alleged.").
491. Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 9-10. For instance, in Pirraglia,the Tenth
Circuit said when a court is faced with two equally strong inferences, it is inappropriate for the
court to determine which inference will prevail. Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188
(10th Cir. 2003).
492. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2510.
493. Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 8-9.
494. Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated, 127
S. Ct. 2499 (2007); see, e.g., In re Cerner Corp. Sec. Litig., 425 F.3d 1079, 1084-85 (8th Cir.
2005) (saying scienter is a factual question, but a complaint must provide a factual basis for
scienter allegations); In re Zonagen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (S.D. Tex. 2003)
("Scienter is an inherently fact-specific issue that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact.");
RMED Int'l, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 389, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
("[Sicienter is a question of fact, and therefore appropriate for resolution by the trier of fact.");
Gabellini v. Rega, 724 F.2d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 1984) (saying questions of scienter are questions
of fact). The question of scienter is largely compared to negligence in tort. Horwich &
Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 8-9. Negligence generally must be decided by the jury because
even when facts are undisputed, reasonable men could reach different results from the facts. Id.
495. Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 481, at 7 ("An inference is an answer to the question,
'What does this fact mean (in the context of the case)?'). Compare Arthur R. Miller, The
PretrialRush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency
Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1083
(2003) (defining questions of law as questions involving the resolution of principles generally
applicable to a class of cases) with Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of
Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1159 (2003) (defining questions of
fact as those requiring inductive inferences about transactions or occurrences in dispute).
496. See Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (saying questions of fact are
reserved for the jury).
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Second, even a court considering only the reasonableness of

inferences drawn from the record (or the complaint as in Tellabs)
contravenes common law procedures, which require the judge to accept
all allegations of the party as true, regardless of the improbability of
those allegations. 4 97 Scholars who reject the traditional fact/law
distinction as a tool to determine the scope of the jury trial 498 make a
compelling argument for the unconstitutionality of summary
judgment. 49 9 This argument is equally applicable to the Tellabs rule.5 °°
According to these scholars, the framework for determining the
constitutionality of procedural devices in lieu of Seventh Amendment
concerns is as follows: (1) under the common law, only the jury or the
parties determine the facts; (2) a court determines the sufficiency of the

evidence only after a jury trial, and even then, if evidence is believed to
be insufficient, the court orders a new trial; and (3) a jury decides a case
with any evidence, however improbable. 50 1 Thus, on a motion for
summary judgment, the moving party argues that no reasonable jury
could find for the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party argues the
opposite. 50 2 The parties dispute what the evidence demonstrates and a
court resolves that dispute. 50 3 For instance, on a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, even reasonable persons, such as Supreme

497. Thomas, supra note 474, at 159. This stricter approach would hold even the Seventh
Circuit's standard unconstitutional. See Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588,
602 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (advocating a reasonableness standard).
498. Sward, supra note 468, at 573-74 (noting that rarely do questions neatly divide into
questions of fact and law); Thomas, supra note 475, at 578-80. One problem with the fact/law
distinction is that at common law, some forms of pleading allowed juries to make de facto
determinations of law, such as where a party used a general issue plea, as well as determinations
of fact. Sward, supra note 468, at 578. Also, it was not easy historically to distinguish fact and
law. Id. at 578-79. Furthermore, sometimes fact and law were classified rather arbitrarily, i.e.,
characterizing the interpretation of written documents as a question of law. Id. at 579-80. In
addition, over the course of history, fact has slowly become law, and thus removed more and
more cases from the province of the jury. Id. at 638-39.
499. Thomas, supra note 474, at 140.
500. In fact, such an argument is in the works. See Thomas, Motion to Dismiss, supra note
465, and Thomas, supra note 334 (discussing the constitutionality of the PSLRA). See also
Thomas, supra note 474, at 140 (discussing the constitutionality of summary judgment). Thomas
does not extend her argument so far as to attack the constitutionality of directed verdicts and
judgments notwithstanding the verdict because they occur after trial. Id. at 176-77.
501. Thomas, supra note 474, at 180. ("Third, a jury would decide a case that had any
evidence, however improbable that evidence was, unless the moving party admitted the facts and
conclusions...").
502. Id. at 161-62.
503. Id. at 162; see also Key Equity Inv. v. Sel-Leb Mktg Inc., No. 06-1052, 2007 WL
2510385, at * 6 (3d Cir. Sept. 6, 2007) (dissent) (dissenting judge disagreeing with the majority
on whether the facts give rise to a strong inference).
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disagree as to the sufficiency of the evidence as a
Court justices,5 may
4

matter of law.

0

After Tellabs, in a securities fraud claim, when a defendant moves to
dismiss, the parties will argue that the inference of scienter drawn from
the facts of the plaintiff's complaint is or is not as likely as competing
inferences. 50 5 The court then resolves this dispute.50 6 The common law
only allowed a judge to consider the sufficiency of the evidence after a
jury trial and verdict. 50 7 Even then, where a judge found insufficient
50 8
evidence, another jury would decide the second case, not the judge.
Moreover, the Court's support for its holding does not justify the
constitutionality of its announced rule. 50 9 The rule set forth in Fidelity

is far different from an actual summary judgment ruling. 510

Under

modem summary judgment, the court does not ultimately accept as true
the plaintiff's allegations; instead, the court reviews the allegations and
5 11
determines whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant.
The issue in Fidelity was that the court did not review the evidence, but
5 12
rather accepted as true the facts alleged by the nonmoving party.
Consequently, the rule in Fidelity more closely resembles a motion to
dismiss, rather than today's summary judgment procedure. 5 13 The
Court in Tellabs created the same problem with a motion to dismiss as it
has with summary judgment-the Court is assessing the evidence, not
accepting all allegations as true, and making a dispositive

504. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 330 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on the grounds that the evidence is sufficient to go to
the jury).
505. See Thomas, supra note 474, at 161-62; see also Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra
note 133, at 36 ("You read [the complaint] in the light favorable to the pleader. You do not weigh.
That is ajury function.").
506. Tellabs, Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-10 (2007).
507. Thomas, supra note 474, at 161.
508. Id.
509. See id. at 164-66 (arguing that the Fidelity decision does not support the constitutionality
of modem day usage of summary judgment); see also Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512 (citing Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. U.S., 187 U.S. 315 (1902)).
510. Compare Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320 (accepting all facts as true) with Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at
2509-10 (accepting only allegations which are at least as likely).
511. Thomas, supra note 474, at 166; see also Valenti v. Qualex, 970 F.2d. 363, 365 (1992)
(noting that summary judgment is not appropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party).
512. Id; see also Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320 ("And the facts stated in the affidavit of defense
will be accepted as true.").
513. Thomas, supra note 474, at 166.
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determination. 5 14 Thus, because the Court's rule requires courts to
determine mixed questions of fact and law at the pleading stage and
creates a rule inconsistent with common law procedures, it violates the
5 15
Seventh Amendment.
D. The Supreme Court Should Have Adopted a ProbableCause
5 16

Approach

The Court's standard should achieve three aims: (1) balance the
threat of strike suits with the interests in preserving injured investors'
right to sue; (2) adopt a known and thus workable standard; and (3)
maintain the integrity of the Seventh Amendment by refraining from
weighing inferences. 5 17 Justice Stevens' probable cause approach,
articulated in his dissenting opinion in Tellabs, achieves these three

aims.

518

First, Justice Stevens' approach achieves the appropriate balance
between preventing frivolous suits and preserving investors' right to
sue. 5 19 He compares corporate defendants to citizens suspected of
engaging in criminal activity. 5 20 Under his approach, only when there
is probable cause can private plaintiffs initiate discovery, thus
heightening the standard. 52 1 Justice Scalia argues that such a standard
does not make sense in this scenario because probable cause is involved

in a criminal proceeding. 522

Presumably, in criminal proceedings

government officials are not prompted by selfish motives like private
litigants. 52 3 In contrast, in a securities fraud class action, plaintiffs and
514. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-10 (requiring courts to weigh inferences); see also
Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 31 ("[T]he motion to dismiss operates as a
dispositivc motion. It cuts off the ability to proceed at all.").
515. See supra notes 465-514 and accompanying text.
516. See generally Murdock, supra note 285, at 53 ("Justice Stevens' analysis [in Tellabs] and
insight are a refreshing contrast to the wordsmithing in which so many federal courts engage in
order to let culpable management off the hook.").
517. See supra Part IV.A-C (describing the problems with the Tellabs decision).
518. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting his probable cause
approach). See also Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 7, 44 (Stevens, J.). But see
Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 8 (Scalia, J.) (saying that in a criminal case the
person seeking the action is a government officer presumptively acting out of no selfish motives
whereas here, in a civil case as here, there is a serious concern of selfish motive).
519. See infra notes 488-499 (depicting how the probable cause approach achieves a
heightened standard but requires no weighing of inferences).
520. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
521. Id.
522. Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 8 (Scalia, J.) (saying that criminal
prosecutors presumptively act out of no selfish motives whereas in civil litigants are highly selfinterested).
523. Id.
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plaintiffs' attorneys are highly self-interested litigants aimed at
extracting money from the defendant. 5 24 Justice Scalia's suggestion

ignores the reality that it is not uncommon for prosecutors to also serve
as self-interested litigants. 525 For example, in a recent high-profile rape
case the prosecutor was found to have withheld exculpatory evidence
52 6
believing a conviction would help further his political career.
Second, a reading of the statute should strive to fit the statute's
language within current existing legal constructs. 527 The statute only
requires a strong inference, not a conclusive one. 528 The statute is

bereft of any language requiring judges to weigh inferences at the

524. Id.
525. See, e.g., Duff Wilson & John Holusha, Duke Case Prosecutor Says He Will Resign,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/us/15cndduke.html?_r=-3&hp=&adxnnl=l &oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1203305349GImJ/xPb94N7JIrHcL/fZQ (discussing the prosecutor who brought rape charges against three
persons but withheld DNA and alibi evidence in order to secure a conviction to further his
political career); Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President: the Intersection of Constitutional
and PopularLaw, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 859, 896-97 (Summer 1999) (quoting Hillary Clinton
describing Kenneth Starr's investigation of former President Bill Clinton's illicit affair with a
White House intern, "We get a politically motivated prosecutor who is allied with the right-wing
opponents of my husband who has literally spent four years looking at every telephone call we've
made, every check we've written, scratching for dirt, intimidating witnesses, doing everything
possible to try to make some accusation."); United States v. Nixon Oral Argument, Editors Note,
9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 59-60 (Fall 1998) (quoting Justice Powell on oral argument
acknowledging the danger of politically motivated prosecutors); Eva M. Fromm, Commanding
Respect: CriminalSanctionsfor Environmental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821, 823-24 (1990)
(arguing that zealous and politically motivated prosecutors seeking to advance their own careers
bring criminal suits "when administrative or civil actions were previously deemed sufficient in
similar situations").
526. Wilson & Holusha, supra note 525 (discussing the prosecutor who brought rape charges
but withheld exculpatory evidence); see also Lara Setrakian & Chris Francescani, FormerDuke
ProsecutorNifong Disbarred,(June 16, 2007), available at http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
story?id=3285862 (discussing the prosecutor's subsequent disbarment and saying, "[The
prosecutor] was driven to prosecute the Duke LaCrosse case out of self-interest and selfdeception.") (internal quotes omitted).
527. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2516-17 (Justices Stevens and Scalia arguing Congress
intended courts to apply a known standard).
528. Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 40.
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pleading stage. 5 29 Justice Stevens' approach adopts a familiar standard:
530
probable cause.
Third, the Court should not adopt an approach whereby courts
disregard facts because of the mere possibility of inferences. 53 1 Justice
Stevens' approach does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment as it
5 32
involves no weighing of competing inferences.
V. IMPACT

Despite the more balanced approach advocated by Justice Stevens in
his dissent, the majority set forth a different standard. 5 33 Thus, attention
must now turn to how the majority's rule will affect securities fraud
plaintiffs. This Part first explores recent circuit court decisions in the
wake of Tellabs.53 4 This Part then examines the outcome of Tellabs on
remand in the Seventh Circuit. 535 As this Part demonstrates, both the
recent circuit decisions and the evolving rule set forth in Tellabs on

529. Brief for Resp. (No. 06-484), supra note 58, at 18. But see Reply Brief of Petitioners at
3, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484) ("It is hard
to imagine what more Congress might say in the Reform Act to make it clear that a departure
from such traditional rules is required."). Congress could have said something to the effect of,
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not apply to Securities Fraud Actions," or "A
plaintiff's complaint is to be judged by the standards set forth in this statute and not the Federal
Rules' liberal notice requirement," or "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not apply."
Presumably, Congress is more than capable of including such direction in a federal statute had it
desired to do so. Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 600 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) ("If Congress had wanted to impose a more stringent scienter
standard, we believe that it would have done so explicitly...").
530. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Congress] implicitly delegated
significant lawmaking authority to the Judiciary in determining how [the] standard should operate
in practice ....
In addition to the benefit of its grounding in an already familiar legal concept,
using a probable cause standard would avoid ... [forcing a court to] take into account plausible
opposing inferences.") (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
531. See Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (telling courts
not to consider any allegations from confidential informants because "perhaps they have axes to
grind").
532. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2517 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens illustrated the
constitutionality of his concept:
There are times when an inference can easily be deemed strong without any need to
weigh competing inferences. For example, if a known drug dealer exits a building
immediately after a confirmed drug transaction, carrying a suspicious looking package,
a judge could draw a strong inference that the individual was involved in the
aforementioned drug transaction without debating whether the suspect might have been
leaving the building at that exact time for another unrelated reason.
Id.
533. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-10.
534. See infra Part V.A (examining two recent circuit court decisions applying Tellabs).
535. See infra Part V.B (discussing the Tellabs result on remand in the Seventh Circuit).
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remand have made it harder for a securities fraud plaintiff to survive a
5 36
motion to dismiss.
A. Recent Circuit Court Decisionsand the Evolution of the Tellabs
Rule
Since Tellabs, courts have engaged in weighing competing
inferences. 537 The lower courts, however, are applying Tellabs in a way
that makes it much harder for a plaintiffs case to survive dismissal.5 38
One recent decision characterized the Tellabs rule as a "mini-trial on the
merits of the case based only on the complaint." 53 9 Two recent circuit
court decisions have taken Tellabs to mean that only allegations pled
with sufficient specificity suffice to create a strong inference. 540 As a
result, plaintiffs may no longer be able to rely on confidential
541
informants in a majority of cases.
In CentralLaborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Electrical Services,
Inc., the Fifth Circuit used the Tellabs decision to dismiss a complaint,
finding that allegations of GAAP violations, 54 2 confidential source
statements, and allegations of insider trading did not collectively give
54 3
rise to a strong inference of scienter.
According to the plaintiff, the defendant corporation IES made
statements expressing confidence in the company's financial health, and
536. See infra Part V.A & Part V.B (illustrating how it is unclear whether a plaintiff may
continue to rely on confidential sources in securities fraud litigation).
537. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); In Re Nat'l
Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Fin. Inv. Litig., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2007 WL 2331929, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio, Aug. 13, 2007); In re Loudeye Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C06-1442MJP, 2007 WL 2404626, at
*5 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
538. Richard D. Bernstein & Frank M. Scaduto, Lower Courts' Handling of 'Tellabs'
'Inference of Scienter,' 238 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Dec. 11, 2007) (surveying lower court decisions since
Tellabs and concluding that plaintiffs now have a lesser chance of surviving dismissal); see also
In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (saying Tellabs requires a
"mini-trial on the merits of the case based only on the complaint").
539. In re ProQuestSec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
540. See infra notes 542-561 and accompanying text (looking at a recent Fifth Circuit and
Seventh Circuit opinion using Tellabs to dismiss a complaint for failing to allege scienter).
541. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
allegations supported by information from confidential informants). For a full discussion of the
use of confidential sources see generally, Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private
Litigation: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure XII FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
551, 556 (2007) (arguing for the use of confidential sources in securities fraud litigation at the
pleading stage).
542. Allegations of violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") alone
without corresponding fraudulent intent are not sufficient to state a securities fraud claim. Chill
v. Gen. Elec., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996).
543. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir.
2007).
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subsequently, the stock price increased. 544 Later, IES publicly stated
that it could not release quarterly earnings on time and that it would
54 5
have to restate its prior financial figures due to material weaknesses.
The plaintiff alleged GAAP violations, failure to fix a known internal
accounting error, and insider trading. 546 The plaintiff relied on
confidential sources to attribute knowledge of the accounting error to
the defendants. 547 The Fifth Circuit invoked Tellabs, finding that the
to determine whether there is a strong
court must weigh the allegations
5 8
inference of scienter. 4
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that violations of GAAP weigh in favor of
establishing scienter where they are alleged in detail because "books do
not cook themselves." 54 9 However, the court found that, absent a lack
of specific job details, such as the particular job descriptions, individual
responsibilities, and specific employment dates for the confidential
sources, confidential source statements do not establish a strong
The court weighed both culpable and
inference of scienter. 550
nonculpable inferences for one of the defendant CEOs. 5 5 1 It balanced
his one-time suspicious stock sale with the fact that he retained much of
his stock after the class period, and weighed the balance against
scienter.552 Regarding the company's former CEO, the court balanced
his suspicious sale with the fact that the sale came in lockstep with his
resignation and obligations incurred under a divorce decree, and found
there was no strong inference of scienter. 553 Ultimately, the court, in
found that there was no strong
reading the complaint holistically,
55 4
law.
of
matter
a
as
inference

544. Id. at 552.
545. Id. at 549.
546. Id. at 552. See generally 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, GAAP
Violation with Fraud-After the Reform Act, in BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD §6:54:140 (2d ed. 2007) (listing the types of GAAP violations that usually survive a
12(b)(6) motion).
547. Cent. Laborers', 497 F.3d at 552.
548. Id. at 553.
549. Id. at 552.
550. Id. In addition, the court rejected the insider trading allegations. Id. at 552-53. For a
more complete explanation of insider trading see generally, Thomas Lee Hazen, Insider Trading
and Rule 10b-5, in 3 LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12:17 (5th ed. 2007).
551. Cent. Laborers', 497 F.3d at 552-54.
552. Id. at 553.
553. Id. at 553-54. The court said his stock sale was suspicious because of the sheer volume
of stock that was sold. Id. See also supra notes 254-257 (discussing the issue remaining after the
Tellabs decision concerning the proper weight for aggregated inferences).
554. Cent. Laborers', 497 F.3d at 555.
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In one case, the Seventh Circuit has since rejected the use of
confidential sources altogether. 555 In Higginbotham v. Baxter, the
defendant company announced it would restate the earnings from the
three preceding years to correct fraudulent statements by its
subsidiary. 55 6 The Seventh Circuit, like Tellabs, echoed the concerns of
frivolous litigation and abusive discovery. 557 The Seventh Circuit
repeated the Tellabs mandate requiring courts to weigh culpable and
nonculpable inferences. 55 8 However, the Seventh Circuit held that all
allegations attributable to confidential witnesses must be discounted
because there is no way to consider opposing inferences. 5 59 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[p]erhaps these confidential sources have
axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying. Perhaps they don't exist ...
Tellabs requires judges to weigh the strength of plaintiffs' favored
inference in comparison to other possible inferences; anonymity
frustrates that process." 560
Thus, no allegations stemming from
56 1
confidential informants were considered.
B. The Tellabs Case on Remand
The Supreme Court did not reverse the Seventh Circuit's holding, but
vacated the decision and remanded it for the Seventh Circuit to apply
the Supreme Court's rule.5 62 In January 2008, the Seventh Circuit
563
resolved the Tellabs case on remand in favor of the plaintiffs.
Because the Seventh Circuit's standard was a lower standard than the
one set forth by the Supreme Court, and because allegations against
defendant Birck were dismissed based on that lower standard, logically,
the Seventh Circuit did not find an inference of scienter as to Birck

555. Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
556. Id. at 755-56. The Brazilian subsidiary reported sales made earlier than their actual dates
to accelerate revenue. Id. When revenue could no longer be accelerated, they simply made up
sales data. Id.
557. Id. at 756 ("Any restatement of a public company's financial results is likely to be
followed by litigation."). The court stated, "A complaint is not a discovery device." Id. at 757.
But see supra Part IV.B (detailing the necessities of discovery and how discovery facilitates
resolution of cases on the merits).
558. Higginbotham,495 F.3d at 756.
559. Id. at 757.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2513 (2007).
563. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 2008).
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under the higher standard. 5 64 Only
the allegations concerning Notebaert
56 5
and Tellabs were considered.
Rather than address the issue of scienter from Notebaert's standpoint
as the court had in its earlier decision, 566 the Seventh Circuit addressed
the issue of scienter from the company's standpoint. 56 7 The court began
by lumping together the two allegations of false statements about the
To review, the
demand for the Titan 5500 and Titan 6500.568
allegations were that Notebaert made statements that demand for the
Titan 5500 was continuing to grow despite a report from Tellabs'
marketing strategy department that revenue from the Titan 5500 would
decline by about $400 million and an internal report from a Tellabs
5 69
market analyst that said demand for the Titan 5500 was "drying up."
The plaintiffs also alleged that Notebaert made statements to financial
analysts that "everything we hear from the customers indicates that our
in-user demand for services continues to grow." 5 70 The plaintiffs also
alleged that Notebaert made a number of false statements concerning
the availability of the Titan 6500. 57 1 The plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs
did not ship a single Titan 6500 during the class period and that the
Titan 6500 was not available.5 72 The plaintiffs also put forth evidence
from a Tellabs sales director that Notebaert saw weekly sales and
production reports. 573 Notebaert made statements saying the 6500 was
"available now" and was "being shipped. ' 574
After the Tellabs decision, weighing the possibility that these
statements were simple, honest mistakes against an inference that the

564. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007) (dismissing Birck under the reasonableness approach); see also
Supplemental Br. of Def.-Appellees at 3 n.2, Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., No.
04-1687, 2008 WL 151180 (7th Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Tellabs Remand, Br. of DefAppellees].
565. Makor, 513 F.3d at 707-08.
566. Makor Issues & Rights. Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 603 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated
127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007).
567. Makor, 513 F.3d at 707-08.
568. Id.
569. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 603 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated
127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
570. Id.
571. Id. at 604.

572.
573.

Id.
Id.

574. Id. Under the Seventh Circuit standard, the court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
pled scienter. Id.
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CEO knowingly lied, 575 there appears to be a fifty-fifty balance, and
thus the tie should go to the plaintiff. 57 6 In fact, the Seventh Circuit
found just this situation. 5 77 The court stated, "There are two competing
inferences .... One is that the company knew ... that the statements
were false, and material to investors. The other is that although the
statements were false . . . their falsity was the result of . . . careless[]
mistakes at the executive level. '5 78
The Seventh Circuit said
nonculpable inferences could be drawn that perhaps lower level
employees accidentally overstated the company's earnings and the
mistake was never caught. 5 79 Also, a nonculpable inference to be
drawn in favor of the defendant company is that perhaps lower level
employees were embezzling and concealing funds. 580 The Seventh
Circuit said that these inferences amount to one inference: an inference
of mistake at the management level.5 8 1 Nevertheless, these inferences
were not as likely as the inference that these statements were made with
intent to deceive. 5 82 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
sheer importance of the products and the fact that no plausible story was
offered by the defendants makes the inference of a culpable scienter
583
more likely than any nonculpable inference to be drawn.
The third allegation was that Tellabs engaged in channel stuffing to
falsely inflate its projected financial health. 5 84 The plaintiffs provided
evidence that a former business manager at Tellabs said Notebaert
worked directly with Tellabs' sales personnel to affect the channel
stuffing.585 The plaintiffs also put forth another confidential source, a
575. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509-10 (2007)
(requiring courts to consider and weigh both culpable and nonculpable inferences).
576. Id.
577. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2008).
578. Id. at 707-08.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 708-09 ("Suppose the false communication by the lower-level employee to his
superiors had been deliberate. Suppose he was embezzling tens of millions of dollars, and by
concealing the embezzlement greatly exaggerated his corporation's assets.").
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id. ("The 5500 was described by the company as its 'flagship' product and the 6500 was
the 5500's heralded successor. They were to Tellabs as Windows XP and Vista are to Micrsoft.");
see also Supplemental Br. of Plaintiff-Appellants at 3, Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs,
Inc., No. 04-1687, 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Tellabs Remand, Br. for PI.Appellants] (distinguishing the facts in Higginbotham and the facts in Tellabs). Similarly,
because the Titan 5500 is Tellabs' "flagship product," it would be difficult to infer that the CEO
was unaware of its market status. Tellabs, 513 F.3d at 707-08.
584. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007).
585. Id.
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high-level sales executive, who admitted that he and his staff fabricated
58 6
purchase orders for products and claimed Notebaert knew about this.
58 7
However, there are two kinds of channel stuffing: good and bad.
Thus, the balance consists of an inference that they engaged in bad
channel stuffing that Notebaert knew about, weighing against an
inference that they engaged in good channel stuffing, along with another
58 8
inference that Notebaert had no idea the channel stuffing took place.
This is not a clear fifty-fifty divide. 589 Whether the channel stuffing
allegation will establish a strong inference on remand depends on how
the court weighs the variety of inferences, namely that Notebaert
knowingly engaged in bad channel stuffing, verses two nonculpable
inferences, one being that he knowingly engaged in good channel
stuffing, and the other being that he unknowingly engaged in bad
channel stuffing. 590 In this case, the Seventh Circuit found more
culpable than nonculpable inferences for the channel stuffing
allegation. 5 9 1 The Seventh Circuit noted that in this case, there were
such a large number of returns such that an inference of ignorance on
behalf of management would be hard to deduce. 59 2 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit found the claim of channel stuffing established a strong
593
inference of scienter.
The Seventh Circuit then turned its attention to whether these allegations

were sufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter for the individual

586. Id. at 605.
587. Tellabs, Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 37-38. Good channel stuffing would
be where a distributor discounts and offers other incentives for persons to buy. Id. Bad channel
stuffing would be where a distributor floods customers with unwanted products and fabricates
orders for purposes of inflating revenue projections. Id.
588. See Makor, 437 F.3d at 604-05 (discussing the allegation of channel stuffing and the
inferences to be drawn from it).
589. See supra Part 1V.A.2 (discussing the ambiguities in the Tellabs decision, including how
exactly inferences are to be weighed).
590. The inferences could weigh in at (I) 30:30:30, (2) 30:60, or (3) 30:30, 30:30. Coffee,
supra note 280. Tellabs provides no indication of how this is to be resolved. Previously, the
Seventh Circuit indicated the complaint alleged sufficient detail of channel stuffing to overcome
the PSLRA's material falsity hurdle. Makor Issues & Rights, 437 F.3d at 598. Similarly, Justice
Stevens believed that the channel stuffing allegations were particularly persuasive. Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2517 n.2 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
591. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 709-10 (7th Cir. 2008).
592. Id. ("The huge number of returns of 5500 systems is evidence that the purpose of the
stuffing was to conceal the disappointing demand for the product rather than to prod distributors
to work harder to attract new customers..
593. Id.
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CEO, Notebaert.5 94 The court found a strong inference of scienter against
Notebaert in his individual capacity because the false statements emanated
595
directly from him.

Lastly, the Seventh Circuit addressed the fact that the plaintiffs alleged
fraudulent conduct through twenty-six confidential informants. 59 6 The
complaint noted the position each held and the dates of their
employment. 597 Subsequent to Tellabs, the Seventh Circuit has held
that allegations from confidential informants will not be considered
Under the
because the court cannot possibly weigh them. 59 8
dismissed
the
claim
to
be
one
would
expect
Higginbotham approach,
599
However, the Seventh Circuit backed away from its
right away.
approach in Higginbotham requiring the steep discountenance of
confidential sources, and instead listed a number of factors which made
the use of confidential sources sufficient in this case. 60 0 The plaintiffs
had twenty-six confidential sources. 60 1 All of these sources were in key
positions sufficient to establish a high likelihood that they had the
information alleged.60 2 The Seventh Circuit said the Tellabs sources
were also prepared to testify. 60 3 And lastly, since the sources'
594. Id. ("Suppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million SUVs in 2006, and
the actual number was zero. There would be a strong inference of corporate scienter, since so
dramatic an announcement would have been approved by corporate officials sufficiently
knowledgeable about the company to know that the announcement was false.")
595. Id. at711-12.
596. Id; see also Tellabs Compl., supra note 97, at 2-4 (listing all twenty-seven confidential
sources and their occupations).
597. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 596-97 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
598. Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
599. However, other Circuits seem to imply that where the confidential informants are so
designated with sufficient information like particular job descriptions, individual responsibilities,
and specific employment dates, a court may weigh such allegations. Cent. Laborers' Pension
Fund v. Integrated Elec. Serv. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 2007). Even still, the descriptions
of the confidential sources contained only the position held and the dates of employment vaguely
described as "substantially prior to the Class Period," or "from prior to the Class Period through
most of the Class Period." Tellabs Compl., supra note 97, at 2-4. Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit may distinguish this case from Higginbothambecause in Tellabs there were some twentyseven confidential sources, while in Higginbotham there were only five. Supplemental Brief of
P.-Appellants at 2, Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., No. 04-1687, 2008 WL 151180,
(7th Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Tellabs Remand, Br. of PI-Appellants]. However, only four
of the twenty-seven anonymous sources discuss Notebaert. Tellabs Remand, Br. of Def.Appellees, supra note 564, at 3-4.
600. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2008).
601. Id. The twenty-seventh confidential source was dropped on remand because the twentyseventh source had allegations that did not pertain to either Notebaert, the Titan 5500, or the Titan
6500. Tellabs Remand, Br. of P-Appellants, supra note 583, at 3 n.3.
602. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2008).
603. Id.
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allegations were corroborated by multiple sources, they were
sufficient. 6°4 Because these factors all weighed in favor of the plaintiff,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the absence of proper names does
not invalidate the drawing of a strong inference from the informants'
605
assertions.
However, no solace should be taken from Tellabs on remand. 60 6 For
one thing, confidential sources still must meet a rather vigorous set of
factors. 607 These factors include: the numerosity of the sources,

whether they are in a position to know the information first-hand,
whether they are prepared to testify, whether the allegations are
described with such specificity as to make them convincing, and
60 8
whether the information is corroborated with multiple sources.
Moreover, in Tellabs the lynchpin on remand was that the statements all
a
involved the company's flagship products. 60 9 Thus, there was
6 10
plaintiffs.
the
of
favor
in
drawn
be
to
compelling culpable inference
In sum, at the outset, the plaintiff will have difficulty surviving a

12(b)(6) motion where the allegations in the complaint rely on
confidential informants. 6 1 1 Plaintiffs now have the additional burden of
either securing witnesses willing to disclose identities or find sufficient

facts in some other way.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Tellabs decision resolves an important question concerning the
sufficiency of scienter allegations in securities fraud actions. The Court
requires plaintiffs to plead facts that establish a strong inference of
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. See infra notes 607-610 and accompanying text (discussing the vigorous factors a
confidential source must meet if confidential sources are allowed at all).
607. See Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing
treatment of confidential sources); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702,
711-12 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing treatment of confidential sources).
608. Makor, 513 F.3d at 711-12 ("The confidential sources listed in the complaint .. are
numerous and consist of persons who from the description of their jobs were in a position to
know at first hand the facts to which they are prepared to testify .... The information that the
confidential informants are reported to have obtained is set forth in convincing detail, with some
of the information, moreover, corroborated by multiple sources.").
609. Id. at 708-09, 711-12. The Seventh Circuit analogized the importance of the products at
issue to Tellabs as Windows XP and Vista are to Microsoft. Id. at 708-09.
610. ld.at708-09.
611. Now in the Seventh Circuit, it is unclear whether allegations resting on confidential
informants will be considered at all and therefore there is a high likelihood that such claims will
be dismissed from the start. Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 757. Now the runner might not even get a
chance at bat, let alone a chance to tie on a base run.
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scienter, such that when culpable inferences are weighed against
nonculpable inferences, the inference of culpability or scienter is at least
as likely as opposing inferences. The Court also establishes that
Congress' pleading schemas do not violate the Seventh Amendment as
they merely provide for plaintiffs to make an issue.
While the Court's standard undoubtedly resolves the circuit split
concerning the weighing of inferences in securities fraud litigation, it
has many negative ramifications. First, the Court fashions the rule by
resting on concerns of frivolous strike suits and nuisance settlements.
This concern is largely unfounded because it is based on common
misperceptions concerning abusive securities class action litigation,
rather than on existing data. In crafting this standard, the Court neglects
other PSLRA provisions as well as a key side of the policy balance:
preserving investors' right to sue. In addition, the rule infringes on the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Scienter, as a question of fact,
must be left for the jury to determine. The Court should have adopted
Justice Stevens' probable cause approach because it achieves the
desired aims of both Congress and the Court and does not run afoul of
the Seventh Amendment.
The Tellabs standard and recent
interpretations of it make it harder for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud
to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. Now, a Tellabs-required mini-trial on the
merits at the pleading stage may result in the dismissal of more
meritorious claims.

